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Abstract:  
This thesis develops a model that investigates aspects of New Zealand’s largest public-
private partnership project, the rollout of Ultra Fast Broadband. The model features four 
cities with different demand and construction-cost characteristics. It is used to study the 
different choices of the private party (Chorus) and the public party (Crown Fibre Holdings 
(CFH)). Using a real options approach, we identify two sorts of potential conflicts between 
the two parties: a timing conflict about the number of cities the two parties would like to 
develop in each period and a sequencing conflict about the order in which the UFB network 
is rolled out in different cities. Inspired by the incomplete contracting and information 
asymmetry literatures, we introduce several incentive schemes (including four subsidy 
schemes and two fine schemes) that help manage the possible conflicts. We compare both 
their ability to reduce the conflicts and their sensitivity to the model’s underlying 
parameters. Overall, there are four main findings. First, the magnitude of the conflict is a 
non-monotonic function of the inter-city demand differences and the inter-city construction-
cost differences; it is an increasing function of the ratio of consumer surplus to producer 
surplus and of demand volatility. Second, a demand-dependent lump sum subsidy has the 
best performance among all included incentive schemes in controlling the possible conflicts. 
Third, the conflict level becomes quite sensitive to the subsidy scheme in two cases. A) When 
either the inter-city demand differences or the inter-city construction-cost differences turn 
out to be modest; B) When either the ratio of consumer surplus to producer surplus or 
demand volatility turns out to be large. The above result may provide some suggestions in 
managing the optimal subsidy. Last but not least, the requirement that Chorus is willing to 
participate in the partnership means that the fine schemes are generally outperformed by 
the subsidy schemes. Relating our findings to the undertaking UFB project, we provide CFH 
with several practical suggestions that may improve its management of possible conflicts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Ultra-Fast Broadband project (UFB) was launched by the New Zealand government and 
outsourced to several infrastructure contractors to provide extremely fast Internet 
connections to 75% of the population in New Zealand by using optical fibre. The whole 
UFB project is estimated to cost $3.5 billion and is expected to be finished at the end of 2019. 
About $1.35 billion of the investment in the UFB project is coming from the government 
and will be managed by the government entity Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH). The Local 
Fibre Companies (LFCs) and Chorus fund the rest of the expenditure on the UFB rollout. 
The public sector often delivers various types of infrastructures to support economic growth. 
Since most infrastructure projects (like the UFB project) feature large-scale investments, a 
long duration of investment recovery and a complex risk profile, one typical problem that the 
public sector faces is budgetary shortfalls. Therefore, with the benefit of additional private 
financing, public private partnerships (PPPs) have developed into a widely used arrangement 
in delivering large-scale infrastructure projects. 
This thesis develops as follows. Chapter 2 provides the institutional background for this 
thesis. First, we briefly mention the institutional structure in the UFB project and give a 
general picture about how the whole UFB project proceeds. We then discuss the main 
sources of demand uncertainty in the UFB project. Through a discussion about how CFH 
funds Chorus‟s UFB rollout, we demonstrate how CFH motivates Chorus to get a higher 
fibre demand through equity and debt subsidies. 
Chapter 3 summarises two aspects of the literature in economics and finance that are 
relevant to this study. The literature in incomplete contracts argues about how managerial 
flexibility can be given to the private party, while the literature in real options analysis 
shows us how the managerial flexibility can be evaluated. 
We introduce the basic version of our model in chapter 4. Like the more general model 
described in chapter 5, this one features four cities with different demand and construction-
cost characteristics, which could be used to study the different choices of the private party 
(Chorus) and the public party (Crown Fibre Holdings). A decision tree has been constructed 
in order to analyse both parties‟ decision making in the basic model. We specify both parties‟ 
objective functions in the UFB project. Chorus cares only about the producer surplus (PS) 
and capital expenditures, whereas CFH cares about the total surplus (customer surplus (CS) 
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plus the producer surplus (PS)) and capital expenditures. Since Chorus pays the same capital 
expenditure but receives fewer surpluses than CFH, the company will be more “capital 
expenditure focussed” than CFH. With the objective functions (for both Chorus and CFH) 
and valuation processes, we identify two potential conflicts between Chorus and CFH. A) a 
timing conflict that Chorus wants to wait longer than CFH to invest; and B) a sequencing 
conflict that Chorus wants to build up city LL (which is a low demand and low cost city) 
before city HH (which is a high demand and high cost city) while CFH wants to build up 
city HH before city LL. In the numerical example, we provide the two parties‟ policy tables 
to illustrate these two conflicts and, more importantly, demonstrate how to calculate the 
present value of the conflict.  
However, the application of the basic model is restricted by its simple assumption that the 
construction required to roll out fibre to a single city can be completed in one period. In 
chapter 5, a shift from the basic model to the general model relaxes this restriction and 
allows the construction required to roll out fibre to a single city to be completed in more than 
one period. Similarly to the basic model case, a decision table has been provided to illustrate 
the possible actions that could be conducted by each player in the two-period model. In order 
to value the conflicts, we update the valuation processes for the general model. Moreover, 
two sorts of incentive schemes have been introduced to help reduce the possible conflicts 
between Chorus and CFH. The first family of incentive schemes we consider is made up of 
various forms of subsidy policies. This family includes a proportional subsidy scheme in 
which Chorus is paid proportional to its construction expenditures in each period, a fixed 
subsidy scheme that pays Chorus a fixed amount of money for each construction stage 
undertaken in each period, an independent lump sum subsidy scheme that pays Chorus a 
fixed amount of money for each city that has been finished in each period, and a demand 
relevant lump sum subsidy scheme in which as soon as a city has been finished, Chorus is 
paid an amount that depends on the demand character of the city. The second family of 
incentive schemes we consider imposes fines on Chorus if specific targets are not met. This 
family includes a simple fine scheme that requires Chorus to pay a fine to CFH 
corresponding to the number of cities not yet finished when the UFB contract expires, and a 
two-dimensional fine scheme in which Chorus is also required to pay a fine for each target it 
misses midway through the UFB contract. Both the description and evaluation formula have 
been provided for each incentive scheme. 
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In order to study the timing conflict and the sequencing conflict separately, we introduce two 
kinds of conflict measures in chapter 6. The timing conflict measure calculates the difference 
between CFH and Chorus in the total numbers of construction stages expected to be finished 
by certain fixed dates in the future. The sequencing conflict measure instead calculates the 
difference between conditional probabilities that CFH and Chorus each prefer to build up a 
city with high demand and high construction cost before a city with low demand and low 
construction cost. The results of numerical analysis in the baseline case (without any 
incentive scheme) demonstrate the conflicts and the corresponding social welfare loss. In the 
second half of chapter 6, we conduct the sensitivity analysis to see how the present value of 
conflict is affected by the model‟s underlying parameters (that is, the ratio of demand in 
high-demand versus low-demand cities, the ratio of construction cost in high-cost versus 
low-cost cities, the relative magnitude of consumer surplus to producer surplus and demand 
volatility). 
Chapter 7 studies the efficiencies of the incentive schemes in reducing the possible conflicts. 
For each subsidy scheme, we first demonstrate the relationship between the conflict level 
(the present value of conflict) and the subsidy scheme variable, thereby identifying the level 
of the subsidy that reduces the conflict to its minimum. We then explain the movement of 
the conflict level over each subsidy by using both the timing conflict measure and the 
sequencing conflict measure. After that, sensitivity analysis on the profile of the optimal 
subsidy has been conducted to analyse how the level of the optimal subsidy (correspondingly 
the level of minimum conflict) is affected by the model‟s underlying parameters (that is, the 
demand ratio, the cost ratio, the relative magnitude of consumer surplus to producer surplus, 
and demand volatility). In the comparison of subsidy schemes, the demand relevant lump 
sum subsidy scheme has been found to perform best in achieving the minimum conflict level. 
We conduct a similar study for the fine schemes and find that they are generally 
outperformed by the subsidy schemes due to their participation constraints. 
We summarise some important findings of this thesis in chapter 8. Relating to the 
undertaking UFB project, we provide CFH with several practical suggestions that may 
improve its management of possible conflicts.  
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Chapter 2: Institutional background 
2.1 An introduction to the institutional structure in the UFB project 
Crown Fibre Holding (CFH), Chorus, Enable Network Limited (ENL), Waikato Networks 
Limited (WNL) and North Power Limited (NP) are the five parties involved in the national 
UFB network roll-out. Generally speaking, the national UFB network will be an outcome of 
the cooperation between the New Zealand government and the private sector. In particular, 
CFH has been established to manage the Government‟s investment in Ultra-Fast Broadband 
infrastructure and aims to achieve the government‟s UFB objectives.1 It can be treated as a 
representative of the government in the UFB project. For the four private sector entities 
(Chorus, ENL, WNL, NP), several different partnerships with CFH have been formed in the 
roll out of the UFB network. The following graph provides a brief summary of the UFB 
project‟s structure. 
Graph 2.1: The main players in the UFB project 
 
As we can see from graph 2.1, Crown Fibre Holdings partners with four individual 
contractors independently in order to deliver the UFB network to the whole country. Chorus 
                                                          
1
 The government’s UFB objectives are to accelerate the roll-out of Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) to 75 per cent 
of New Zealanders over ten years, concentrating in the first six years on priority broadband users such as 
businesses, schools and health services, plus green field developments and certain tranches of residential 
areas. 
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(which is separated from the Telecom group since Telecom won the tender) is the biggest 
player in the UFB project. 
To simplify our research into the UFB infrastructure project, we ignore the participation of 
Waikato Networks Limited, Enable Networks and North Power, therefore giving us a simple 
structure of a private public partnership between CFH and Chorus. 
2.2 A brief discussion of private public partnerships  
2.2.1 A definition of a private public partnership 
Although private-public partnerships (PPPs) are enjoying a rapid growth globally, a general 
agreement on the definition of PPPs has hardly been made in the academic literature. Some 
see it as a new governance tool, while others believe PPPs are just a “language game”. Since 
the purpose of this thesis is not to end the PPP definition debate, we simply adopt a PPP 
definition which is consistent with the UFB project. That is, 
The private public partnership is the cooperation of some kind of durability between public 
and private sectors in which they mutually develop products and services and share risks, 
costs and resources which are associated with these products.
2
 
The UFB project fits this definition in three ways. First, PPPs cannot form by short term 
contracts (clearly, the UFB contracts between CFH and Chorus last more than twenty years). 
Second, risk sharing and cost and resource saving are two main purposes of PPP formation 
(CFH and Chorus are sharing some risks on the UFB rollout). Third, a product or a service 
had been mutually provided by public and private sectors as a consequence of their 
cooperation (which is the fibre service in UFB case). 
2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of PPPs over conventional procurement 
Compared with traditional procurement, PPPs have some advantages. First, PPPs are better 
in whole-of-life project evaluation.
3
 This opinion has been supported by several empirical 
studies. After evaluating 50 UK projects , MacDonald (2002) suggests that the capital 
expenditure of PPPs have only 1 per cent budget over-run on average, while traditional 
                                                          
2
 For more detail see Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001). 
3
 The whole-of-life assessment under conventional procurement is carried out by a public agency which 
doesn’t normally bear the financial consequences of getting it wrong. However, the whole-of-life assessment 
under PPPs is carried out by a private party which has arguably a stronger incentive than a government 
agency to be realistic about the prospects of a project. Therefore, the whole-of-life project evaluation under 
PPPs is normally better than that in traditional procurement. 
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procurement projects have 47 per cent cost over-run on budget on average. HM Treasury 
(2003) studied 61 PPP projects and found only 11 per cent of them were behind schedule, 
and none of them were over the public sector budgets. The UK National Audit Office (NAO, 
2003; 2005) compared the construction performance of PPPs and traditional procurement. 
Only 30 per cent of conventional projects were on time and only 27 per cent were within 
budget. By contrast, the PPPs were largely delivered on time or early (76 per cent versus 30 
per cent) and on budget (78 per cent versus 27 per cent). Besides, some believe that PPPs 
normally come up with better design and operation and less whole-of-life costs 
4
 (such as 
Katz (2006), Grimsey and Lewis (2007)).  
On the other hand, the application of PPPs is not a free lunch. That is, PPPs are typically 
much more complicated and higher tendering, contracting and renegotiation costs often 
occur (Katz (2006), Grimsey and Lewis (2007)).  
2.3 The Technology of UFB roll-out 
2.3.1 The difference between passing a premise and connecting a premise in UFB roll-
out 
The amount of subsidy received by Chorus depends on the number of premises passed by the 
UFB network, as well as the number of premises connected to the network. To avoid 
ambiguity, we give the definitions of passing a premise and connecting a premise (either 
from NIPA
5
 or CFH annual report). 
Passed means:  
Where premises have been passed with fibre optic cable, or conduit capable of having fibre 
optic cable inserted, and the premises are able to be connected to the nearest point of the 
premises’ boundary. 
Connection means:  
(a) The cable joining the Fibre Access Point to the External Termination Point of a Premises, 
with such cable to be either from the pit on the adjoining boundary of two properties where 
                                                          
4
 Compared with conventional procurement, the designers and builders under PPPs normally have a financial 
stake in the project over its whole life. Therefore, the designers and builders are more likely to have a strong 
incentive to design features and construction standards so they are optimized against the long-term cost of 
maintenance and operational requirements. 
5
 NIPA is the abbreviation of Network Infrastructure Project Agreement. 
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the Fibre Access Point is located in underground deployment, or from the pole nearby to a 
number of Premises in aerial deployment; and 
(b) All other infrastructure (excluding Communal Infrastructure) necessary to enable the 
provision of the Specified Layer 1 Services and Specified Layer 2 Services to the relevant 
End User, as required under Schedule 5 (Service Levels); 
The difference between passing a premise and connecting a premise is that passing provides 
the end users capability of connecting their premises to the fibre network, while connecting 
means the end users are going to sign up the fibre services and Chorus will send people to 
connect end users‟ premises to the fibre access point. 
2.3.2 The fibre deployment costs with different deployment techniques 
On the UFB rollout, Chorus may deploy fibre optic cables in the access network with a 
variety of techniques. The costs of deployment depend on the deployment method that 
Chorus applies. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of fibre deployment costs with the most 
common deployment techniques. 
Table 2.1: A comparison of fibre deployment costs with different deployment 
techniques 
Deployment techniques The costs associated  Comments 
Aerial deployment The typical aerial cost is 
around $30-$50 per meter. 
Aerial deployment is a low cost approach for the 
deployment of fibre optic cable where existing 
poles. However, this method is not available in any 
urban areas which already have all underground 
facilities. Besides, some Local Councils vigorously 
discourage the deployment of new aerial plant (for 
visual pollution), which restricts the application of 
aerial deployment in New Zealand.
6
 
Shallow trenching The typical cost for shallow 
trenching is around $70-90 
per meter. 
Shallow trenching has not been used in New 
Zealand due to perceived issues with the negative 
impact of this deployment on road maintenance. 
However, there are modern approach to implement 
this technique in a way can minimize any impact on 
road maintenance. 
                                                          
6
 Milner (2009) claims that about 30%-40% of homes and businesses on the UFB rollout might be suitable for 
aerial deployment under ideal conditions. 
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Micro trenching The cost of micro trenching 
is around $50-70 per meter 
along street curbs or $30-50 
per meter alongside grass 
verges. 
This may be the most promising approach to 
achieve reduced costs for fibre deployment in New 
Zealand. However, the micro trenching is still under 
the trial to see how it works in New Zealand road 
conditions.
7
  
Mole plough trenching The typical cost for 
deployment of fibre using a 
mole plough lies in the 
range of $20-40 per meter. 
Although this method comes with low deployment 
costs, it can only be operated in soft ground. 
Therefore, the amount of mole plough trenching 
that could be applied in fibre urban deployment 
would be very small. 
Directional drilling The typical cost for 
directional drilling is around 
$50-70 per meter. 
The cost for directional drilling is highly variable 
with ground conditions. It is widely applied in cities 
like Christchurch and Hamilton, but can be quite 
challenging in cities like Wellington, Dunedin and 
parts of Auckland. Besides, directional drilling 
normally requires to be combined with traditional 
open trenching. 
Open trenching Simple trenching can cost as 
little as $120-150 per meter, 
while the costs can explode 
to $500-600 per meter when 
substantial concrete cutting, 
rock cutting and 
reinstatement is required. 
Open trenching is a highly labour intensive process 
and so the costs are high. Due to the costs, open 
trenching is treated as a last resort in any urban 
fibre deployment. 
*sourced from Fibre-to-the-Premise Cost Study (produced by Milner Consulting Limited at February 2009) 
Within the defined UFB coverage area, there are widespread variations in deployment 
conditions. Since the different deployment conditions may require a different combination of 
deployment methods, it is highly likely that the deployment costs vary widely over the UFB 
coverage areas. Even if deployment conditions are homogeneous over the country, the total 
deployment costs are still heterogeneous across the UFB coverage area due to the variation 
in population density.  
2.3.3 An introduction to the UFB rollout process 
 
                                                          
7
 Some roading engineers claim, with the micro trenching, there is a high risk of roads falling apart and of fibre 
being damaged by stress from traffic or cut by contractors when they are digging to repair other utilities. This 
is sourced from http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/3832735/UFB-trenching-trials-to-begin-in-September. 
15 
 
Graph 2.2: A brief introduction to the UFB rollout process 
 
As we can see from graph 2.2, the UFB rollout has two main processes. The first one is the 
fibre network deployment (in this process, premises will be passed with fibre optic cable), 
while the second one is the fibre uptake (in this process, the end customers will be connected 
to the fibre network and start to enjoy the UFB services). In the fibre network deployment 
process, Chorus delegates the network infrastructure construction to several construction 
contractors through the build contracts. In the fibre uptake process, internet service providers 
(ISPs) act as an intermediary between Chorus and end users. Actually, Internet service 
providers set up and advertise their own fibre schemes in order to get the end users.
8
 Then, 
they place the orders to Chorus and ask Chorus to connect the end customers to the fibre 
network.
9
 In the supply side, internet service providers help Chorus communicate and pass 
fibre services to the end users. Of course, the money from end users will go to the service 
provider first and Chorus second.  
2.4 Chorus’s flexibility in the UFB project 
2.4.1 Chorus’s flexibility in deciding the network deployment plan 
A network deployment plan is an operative document which set out the plan for Chorus to 
deploy the fibre network during a certain timeframe. In general, a network deployment plan 
summarizes Chorus‟s timing and ordering in the fibre network construction during a certain 
                                                          
8
 The retail contracts link the end users to internet service providers. 
9
 The wholesale contracts link the internet service providers to Chorus. 
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timeframe. Therefore, Chorus‟s decision-making power to change a deployment plan 
influences its level of managerial flexibility in the UFB network deployment. For example, 
at each review period of the master network deployment plan
10
, CFH will provide Chorus 
with CFH‟s prioritization criteria11 and the minimum number of premises to be passed in 
each network deployment plan period for the period leading up to the next review period. On 
the other hand, Chorus will provide CFH with:
 
 
a) The Company’s Patches which make up the Coverage Area; 
b) Candidate Areas within each Patch; 
c) Start and completion build milestones for each Candidate Area; 
d) Expected annual Premises Passed (including Priority Users) in each Patch and 
Candidate Area; and 
e) Build periods per Candidate Area (if any). 
Although there are some constraints
 12
, the fact that Chorus provides part of the information 
to review the deployment plan indicates that some decision-making power in the deployment 
review has been passed to Chorus. Therefore, Chorus has some level of managerial 
flexibility in the UFB network deployment. 
2.4.2 The speed-up and deferral options 
In the UFB project, Chorus is allowed to speed up the fibre network deployment process.
13
 
Besides, NIPA may grant Chorus some flexibility to defer the network deployment in certain 
coverage areas:
 14
 
The company will be entitled to a reasonable extension to the relevant Milestone Date (and, 
to the extent reasonably necessary, any subsequent Milestone Dates) for some Delay Causes, 
provided that such extension is proportionate to the duration of the delay, taking into 
                                                          
10
 The master network deployment plan will be used to guide each subsequent Deployment Plan (the network 
deployment plan specifies the procedure of fibre network deployment in each year). 
11 This means any information or guidance to be provided to the Company by CFH indicating the preferred 
order of Area Units and/or Candidate Areas. 
12
 For example, Chorus needs to follows CFH’s prioritization criteria and the minimum number of premises to 
be passed in each deployment period. Besides, CFH has a final approval right to change the network 
deployment plan.  
13
 In 2012 CFH annual financial report, the chairman of CFH states that the Government’s goal of substantially 
passing more than 70,000 premises by 30 June was comfortably exceeded (76,000 premises substantially 
passed). 
14
 For more detail on all plan details in this section, see Network Infrastructure Project Agreement.  
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account all measures the Company can reasonably take to mitigate the effect of the delay 
and make up lost time; 
One of the Delay Causes is: 
The number of Premises Passed for the Performance Milestone being more than 5% higher 
than the estimated number of Premises to be Passed for the Performance Milestone (as set 
out in the Network Deployment Plan), 
The above terms mean that if Chorus is able to speed up the fibre rollout in some coverage 
areas (such as the areas with low capital expenditure) to make the total number of premises 
passed be 5% higher than the target in the deployment plan, Chorus will be entitled to 
exercise a deferral option to rollout fibre in the other coverage areas (such as the areas with 
high capital expenditures). In other words, Chorus has some flexibility to defer the 
deployment process in certain areas when the certain circumstance has been met. 
2.4.3 The abandonment option 
According to NIPA, Chorus has the option to pay CFH a penalty and terminate its agreement 
with CFH for designing and building up the UFB network, with the penalty capped at $360 
million.
15
 In practice, this arrangement grants Chorus an abandonment option, which allows 
Chorus to sell the UFB project back to CFH for a fixed strike price K of            . The 
abandonment option is thus similar to a standard put option.  
For a standard put option, reducing the strike price reduces the margin between the strike 
price and the value of the underlying asset, therefore decreasing the present value of the put 
option. Similarly, for this abandonment option, increasing of the penalty cap raises the cash 
outflow that Chorus needs to incur to abandon the project. Therefore, it reduces the present 
value of the abandonment option.  
As we can see from graph 2.3, the value of the abandonment option becomes positive as 
long as the present value of the UFB project for Chorus is less than the strike price K 
(K=            ). When the value of K decreases (when the penalty cap increases), the 
present value line of the abandonment option moves to the left, which gives Chorus less 
                                                          
15
 This calculation is based on $350 million (Maximum Aggregate Liability) plus $50,000 a day for up to six 
months (Material Breach Liquidated Damages). For more detail see Network Infrastructure Project 
Agreements (NIPA) or http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/9457779/Broker-suggests-Chorus-should-
walk-away. 
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protection from the downside risks. Besides, the value of the abandonment option may vary 
over the uncertainties of capital expenditures and fibre demand in the UFB project (since 
capital expenditures and fibre demand determine the present value of UFB project for 
Chorus).  
Graph 2.3: the present value of the abandonment option 
 
2.5 The demand risk of the UFB roll-out 
In a regulated broadband wholesale market like New Zealand, the revenue streams of the 
network operators (Chorus) are determined by two main uncertainties. The first one is the 
average bandwidth demand uncertainty and the second one is the UFB connection number 
uncertainty.  
2.5.1 The bandwidth demand uncertainty 
The average bandwidth demand here describes the speed that the average customer requires 
for their UFB plans. As we know that the total revenue of Chorus in any certain time period 
simply equals the product of existing connection number and average charged price, the total 
revenue of Chorus from the UFB Project changes if either term changes. 
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Since the fibre price caps have been agreed between CFH and Chorus in the UFB contract, 
the unit prices Chorus can charge its customers could be treated as fixed over time.
16
 The 
only source of volatility to the average charged price may come from people‟s decisions 
among different speed plans. For example, the average charged price may go up if more 
customers want to choose a “fast” UFB plan rather than a “slow” UFB plan and vice versa. 
And what does generally change people‟s migration decisions to different speed UFB plans 
over time? The popularity of internet TV, Cloud services, HD videos or any other coming 
internet high-tech services may have impact on the numbers of customers choosing to 
migrate from a copper plan to a “fast” UFB plan or a “slow” UFB plan. For example, if the 
cloud services become much more successful, more people may want to choose a “fast” 
UFB plan since a good experience of cloud service requires a fast upload speed.  
2.5.2 The UFB uptake uncertainty  
The second main source of total revenue volatility is contributed by the number of 
households connecting to the UFB network (take-up). What contributes to the volatility of 
the UFB connection number? As we discussed above, the popularity of “new” internet 
technologies may influence the demand of bandwidth, which may partially determine the 
number of existing copper network customers wanting to migrate to the fibre network and 
the number of potential new internet users who would like to connect to the fibre network. 
Besides, the relative prices between copper and fibre may dramatically change customers‟ 
incentives of migration from copper to fibre.
17
 Since New Zealand‟s broadband wholesale 
market is currently under regulation, the change of relative prices between copper and fibre 
could be grouped as political risk. 
2.6 A brief introduction about the CFH financing of Chorus’s UFB roll-out 
On the UFB rollout, Chorus will self-fund the design and build work and carry the risk of 
any cost overruns in the network build. CFH, as a public sector support in the UFB project, 
will invest up to $929 million in Chorus progressively during the fibre deployment as 
                                                          
16
 Although the fibre contract prices are changing over the UFB period, these changes are predetermined by 
CFH and Chorus in the UFB contracts. Therefore, there is not any uncertainty involved in fibre contract prices. 
For more detail see “Submission in response to the Commerce Commission’s Draft Determination to amend 
the price payable for the regulated service Chorus’ unbundled bitstream access made under s 30R of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001”. 
17
 If the reduction of copper service wholesale prices unlikely pass through to the end users, the margin of 
retail service providers in copper service will be enhanced and therefore encourage retail service providers to 
stay in copper service rather than jumping to fibre. 
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premises are passed and network build stages are completed, including UAT.
18
 CFH‟s 
investment in Chorus is essentially a 50:50 mix of debt and equity. To allow CFH to 
participate in the upside of the financial performance of the company, Chorus will also issue 
one equity warrant to CFH for each $1 of CFH equity securities. However, the present value 
of CFH warrants is quite small when compared to the CFH equity and debt.
19
 Therefore, we 
focus mainly on the CFH equity and debt.  
Although CFH‟s initial investment in Chorus‟s UFB rollout is independent of both demand 
and capital expenditure, Chorus has a relatively large liability to pay back CFH‟s initial 
investment in the future if the fibre uptake (the demand of fibre) turns out to be below a 
certain level. Actually, in present value terms, Chorus receives more subsidy from CFH if 
the demand of fibre becomes relatively high, which works as an incentive scheme from CFH 
that motivates Chorus to reach a higher demand on the UFB rollout. The rest of the chapter 
demonstrates how this incentive scheme works using CFH equity and debt securities. 
2.6.1 The CFH equity securities 
1. The description of CFH equity securities 
According to the agreement between Chorus and CFH, half of the CFH investment in 
Chorus will be exchanged for Chorus equity securities, which are known as CFH equity 
securities. However, these equity securities bear no dividend payment until 2025 and 
partially attract dividends payment after 2025.The portion of CFH equity securities that 
attract dividends in each year depends on the fibre uptake rate in 2019 (whether the fibre 
uptake rate goes over 20%). The CFH equity securities could be treated as a kind of 
preferred stock since they generally carry no right to vote at Chorus shareholder meetings, 
but offer a repayment preference on liquidation. Moreover, compared to the normal 
preferred stocks, the CFH equity securities are redeemable and dividend non-payable in a 
certain period (between 2012 and 2025). 
2. The cash flow of CFH equity securities  
Table 2.2 shows the dividend scheme for CFH equity securities from 2025 to 2036. The 
dividend payment is dependent on which scenario Chorus is going to sit in the 30 June 2020 
                                                          
18
 UAT refers the user acceptance testing. 
19
 In 2012 CFH annual report, the fair value of CFH warrant is only 11,000 NZ dollars, while the fair value of 
CFH securities are more than 10 million NZ dollars. Actually, it is unlikely that these warrants will be exercised 
by CFH unless Chorus’s stock return exceeds a return hurdle of 16% per annum in the relevant period. 
21 
 
uptake test. For example, if the fibre uptake is less than or equal to 20% in 2020, $155 
million (33.3%) of CFH equity is required to pay a dividend in 2025. In contrast, if the fibre 
uptake is more than 20%, only $86 million (18.5%) of CFH equity is required to pay a 
dividend in 2025. Besides, the portion of CFH equity securities that attracts a dividend is 
increasing and cumulating over time. Not later than 2036, all CFH equity securities attract 
dividends. 
Table 2.2: CFH equity securities’ redemption and dividend table ($m) 
30 June 2020 test 30 June ($ million in dollar term) 30 June ( in percentage term) 
 2025 2030 2033 2035 2036 2025 2030 2033 2035 2036 
Senario A Fibre uptake less than or equal to 20% 
Equity on which dividends 
became payable 
155 310  465  33.3% 66.7%  100%  
Senario B Fibre uptake greater than 20% 
Equity on which dividends 
became payable 
86 172 300  465 18.5% 36.9% 64.6%  100% 
 *sourced from Crown Fibre Holding 2012 annual report 
Graph 2.4: A comparison of dividend rate distribution between fibre uptake states 
  
Graph 2.4 shows a comparison of dividend rate distribution between two fibre uptake states 
(from 2025 to 2036). The horizontal axis represents the year and the vertical axis represents 
the cumulative dividend yield of CFH equity securities for that particular year. As we can 
see clearly from graph 2.4, the blue line dominates the red line in all periods. This indicates 
that the CFH equity securities are less valuable in the state H (when the uptake rate is over 
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20%) than in the state L (when the uptake rate is equal or less than 20%). In other words, 
CFH motivates Chorus to work harder in the UFB infrastructure by offering it an equity 
subsidy with a higher present value. 
3. The present value calculation of CFH equity subsidy  
In order to get the present value of the CFH equity subsidy, we need to estimate the present 
value of CFH‟s equity investment first. According to CFH„s financial statement in 2012, for 
each premises passed, CFH needs to subscribe to $559 of equity securities and $559 of debt 
securities from Chorus, so the cash flows of CFH‟s equity investment depend on the UFB 
infrastructure process. In this section, the present value of CFH‟s initial investment is 
calculated by discounting the scheduled equity investment by the risk-free discount rate.
20
  
Graph 2.5: The numbers of premises expected to have been built by Chorus in each 
financial year 
 
*sourced from Crown Fiber Holding 2012 annual report 
Graph 2.5 provides information about the numbers of premises that are going to be passed 
by Chorus in the next seven financial years, which indicates the expected future cash flows 
of CFH‟s equity investment in Chorus‟s UFB roll-out. The expected cash flow of CFH‟s 
equity investment could be calculated by multiplying the numbers of premises passed by 
Chorus in each financial year by $559. The present value of CFH initial equity investment in 
Chorus‟s UFB roll-out equals $429 million.  
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 Since CFH is a New Zealand government entity, CFH’s initial investment in Chorus’s UFB roll-out is 
guaranteed by the New Zealand government. Therefore, we may treat CFH’s initial investment as a series of 
risk-free cash flows. 
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Next step, we are going to calculate the present value of CFH‟s equity securities. From 
above, the CFH equity securities are a kind of redeemable preferred share, which is non-
dividend bearing in the first 12 years. We assume the preferred stocks will not be redeemed 
before they attract full dividends to simplify our evaluation. As we know the required 
dividend rate for the equity is 8.68% (2.68% 180 bank rate +6% margin rate). We can treat 1 
dollar of CFH preferred stock in its full face value when they start to attract full dividends 
(2035 in state L, 2036 in state H). Then, we discount the 1 dollar from 2035 (2036 in state H) 
back to 2013 to get the present value of the principal. Respectively, the present value of the 
equity principal in two uptake states from our calculation is $74.5 million and $68.6 million. 
Similarly, the present value of the dividend payment for each state equals $61.26 million in 
state L and $41.24 million in state H. We combine the present value of principal with the 
present value of dividend payments to get the present value or equity securities in each state.  
In 2013, the present values of CFH equity securities are $135.8 million for state L and 
$109.8 million for state H. Accordingly, the present value of equity subsidies equals $293.2 
million at state L and $319.2 million at state H. 
2.6.2 The CFH debt securities 
1. The description of CFH debt securities  
The CFH debt securities are unsecured and non-interest bearing. They carry no voting rights 
and will be required to be repaid fully at certain dates, with the repayment dates determined 
by the result of the fibre uptake test at 30 June 2020. If the NIPA is terminated under certain 
termination events, CFH can elect whether to continue to hold the CFH debt securities or 
require Chorus to repay these in cash. 
2. The cash flow of CFH debt securities 
Table 2.3 shows the repayment scheme for CFH debt securities from 2025 to 2036. The debt 
payment is dependent on which scenario Chorus is going to sit in the 30 June 2020 uptake 
test. That is, $155 million of debt Chorus needs to repay CFH in 2025 when the fibre uptake 
is low, while $86 million of debt Chorus needs to repay CFH in 2025 when the fibre uptake 
is high.  
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Table 2.3: CFH’s debt securities repayment profile ($m)   
30 June 2020 test 30 June ($ million in dollar term) 30 June ( in percentage term) 
 2025 2030 2033 2035 2036 2025 2030 2033 2035 2036 
Senario A Fibre uptake less than or equal to 20% 
Debt repayment 155 155  155  33.3% 33.3%  33.3%  
Senario B Fibre uptake greater than 20% 
Debt repayment 86 86 129  164 18.5% 18.5 27.7%  35.4% 
*sourced from Crown Fibre Holding 2012 annual report 
Graph 2.6: A comparison of CFH debt repayment schemes between fibre uptake states 
 
Graph 2.6 shows a comparison of CFH debt repayment schemes between two fibre uptake 
states (from 2025 to 2036). The horizontal axis represents the year and the vertical axis 
represents the cumulative portion of CFH debt securities that has been repaid in that 
particular year. Unquestionably, the repayment scheme in state H (over 20% uptake rate) is 
more “soft” than in state L. In graph 2.6, the repayment scheme at state L dominates the 
repayment scheme at state H, which represents that Chorus always needs to repay the debt 
earlier when the fibre uptake rate is low in the future. Similar to the equity subsidy, CFH 
offers a higher present value debt subsidy to Chorus if the fibre demand turns out to be good. 
3. The present value calculation of CFH debt subsidies  
As for CFH‟s equity investment, the present value of CFH‟s initial debt investment in 
Chorus‟s UFB roll-out equals $429 million. In order to calculate the present value of CFH 
debt securities, we discount all debt repayment cash flows back to 2013 in an annual 
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discount rate of 6.67%. By doing that, we get the present values of the CFH debt securities 
equal to $159.4 million for state L and $141.6 million for state H. Accordingly, the present 
values of debt subsidies should equal $269.6 million at state L and $287.4 million at state H. 
Recall that, at state L, the present value of the debt subsidy equals $269.6 million and the 
present value of the equity subsidy equals $293.2 million. Therefore, the present value of 
total subsidies (debt subsidies and equity subsidies) should equal $563 million at state L. On 
the other hand, at state H, the present value of the debt subsidy equals $287.4 million and the 
present value of the equity subsidy equals $319.2 million, which indicates that the present 
value of total subsidies at this case should equal $606 million. As we can see clearly, the 
amount of total subsidy is bigger if fibre demand is bigger. Therefore, by comparing the 
present value of subsidy to the states of UFB uptake, CFH motivates Chorus to work hard in 
order to have a higher demand on the UFB rollout. 
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Chapter 3: Literature reviews 
In a PPP project, the information asymmetry and contract incompleteness provide the private 
party with considerable managerial flexibility, which we study using real options analysis.  
The term information asymmetry here describes the situation when information is not 
symmetrically allocated between two parties. That is, one of them has superior information 
on several important parameters relating to undertaking the project over the other. Normally, 
the information advantage will be allocated to the agent rather than the principal. In the 
example of the UFB project, Chorus may have better information about the “true” capital 
expenditure required to roll out a fibre network than CFH.  
In general, two kinds of consequences can be caused by information asymmetry: ex post 
inefficiency and ex ante inefficiency, where the terms ex post and ex ante refer to 
inefficiencies that arise respectively after and before forming the contract.
21
 
The case of ex post inefficiency is that in which the agent can benefit from its superior 
information by pursuing its own interests at the cost of the principal, since the principal 
cannot verify the effort of the agent in a particular job (“hidden agenda”). In the case of the 
UFB project, if CFH cannot observe the capital expenditure function of Chorus, the firm 
may be able to “inflate” its apparent capital expenditures in order to get “extra” 
reimbursements from CFH.  
In contrast, if CFH can observe the capital expenditure function of Chorus after signing the 
contract, a cost-reimbursement incentive scheme (a proportional subsidy in our model) can 
be applied therefore the majority of conflict in our case can be eliminated. However, the 
application of a cost-reimbursement incentive scheme does not necessarily eliminate the 
conflict completely, since part of the conflict may rise from ex ante inefficiency. Therefore, 
in order to eliminate the conflict completely, CFH may need to have perfect information to 
pick up the best agent to undertake the UFB project (if the quality of service could be 
specified, the differences of agent are only on their capital expenditure functions, with 
complete competition, there must be a “right” agent for UFB project which can produce the 
global minimum conflict). 
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 A nice summary of this literature can be found in Laffont and Tirole(1993). 
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3.1 The literature review of PPPs in the scope of incomplete contracts 
Under a symmetric information assumption, Hart et al. (1997) set up a single stage model to 
compare the desirability of private and public ownership when there exists both quality-
improvement (productive) and cost reduction (unproductive) investments for the manager. 
Their model indicates that when the ownership is allocated to the private sector the manager 
will reduce costs excessively, at the expense of quality, whereas with public ownership there 
are blunted incentives for both cost reduction and quality improvements. Therefore, they 
suggest that private ownership should be the case when the quality reductions from 
unproductive investment can be somehow controlled through contracting and quality 
improvement innovations are what matter. In contrast, when cost-cutting innovations are 
non-contractible and have a larger adverse effect on quality, and when quality-improvement 
innovations do not matter, the case of nationalization should be stronger. 
Except for the optimal ownership allocation, the impact of bundling various production 
stages is one of the main issues in the previous literatures. Hart (2003) built up a multiple-
stage version of the model
22
 in Hart et al. (1997) to study the costs and benefits of public-
private partnerships. In his model, two production stages (both building and operating) are 
included in order to model the impacts of cross-stage externalities on investment incentives. 
In stage 0, a builder has the flexibility to choose the level of two sorts of investments 
(productive and unproductive) which may both reduce the operating costs, however only the 
productive investment improves the service quality therefore increasing the social benefits; 
the unproductive investment reduces the social welfare. Under unbundling (traditional 
procurement), the builder cannot internalize the effect of this effort on benefits nor on costs. 
He exerts too little of his effort on the productive investment but the right amount on the 
unproductive investment. In contrast, under the case of bundling (PPPs), the builder again 
does not internalize the social benefits, but does internalize the costs. As a result, he 
implements a more appropriate level of productive investment (compared with the case of 
bundling), although still too little compared to the case of first-best, but also too much of the 
unproductive investment. Hart suggests that bundling (PPPs) is preferred over traditional 
                                                          
22 Although Hart (2003)’s model setting is similar to that of Hart et al. (1997), several differences can be found 
between them. First, for simplicity, Hart (2003) ignores the choice between public and private ownership and 
assumes that all provision is private. Second, in order to estimate the effects of cross-stage externalities, Hart 
(2003) added an operation stage to the single-stage model. 
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procurement when the unproductive investment can be well incentivized by the contract, 
whereas the productive investment cannot be. In contrast, when the productive investment 
can be well incentivized by the contract but the unproductive investment cannot, the 
unbundling (traditional procurement) should be the case.  
Combining bundling and ownership allocation, Bennett and Iossa (2006) use a richer model 
to study the desirability of PPPs. The main contribution of their study to the literature is the 
observation that allocating ownership rights to an agent may reduce his bargaining power 
when there exists externalities. There are two sorts of externalities in their description. A 
building innovation that improves the social welfare benefit and comes with a reduced 
operation cost is what they call positive externality. In contrast, a building innovation that 
improves the social welfare benefit but comes with an increased cost at the operation stage is 
what they call a negative externality. Ownership gives the control right to the owner to 
decide whether to implement quality-enhancing or cost-cutting innovations proposed by the 
investor. PPPs are always preferred over traditional procurement when there exists a positive 
externality, and vice versa when there is a weak negative externality. Private ownership is 
nevertheless optimal for generic facilities with high residual value. Although their research is 
similar to that by Hart (2003), there are several important differences. First, a renegotiation 
process takes place since Bennett and Iossa (2006) assume that although both investments 
are unverifiable ex ante they are verifiable ex post.
23
 Besides, a residual stage has been 
added to Bennett and Iossa‟s (2006) model to study the explicit role of residual value. Last 
but not least, the ownership of assets is not a point in Hart (2003)‟s model 24 but plays an 
important role in Bennett and Iossa‟s (2006) model. 
By allowing a compensation scheme and risk-averse agents, Martimort and Pouyet (2008) 
extend their model to a more complete contracting scope (both the quality of the 
infrastructure and operating costs are contractible, although not perfectly). Incentives and 
welfare are higher under a PPP project when there is a positive externality between building 
and operation stages compared to traditional procurement. The reverse may happen for a 
negative externality. Although ownership still could be used to align incentives, its effect is 
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 Hart (2003) assumes investments are unverifiable both ex ante and ex post. 
24
 As we discussed before, Hart (2003) ignores the choice between public and private ownership to simplify 
the model. 
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weaker 
25
 and less important than the decision of bundling. Besides, they found that part of 
the benefits of bundling (PPPs) could be explained by better risk sharing. 
As in much of the literature, the character of cross-stage externalities plays a huge role in 
determining the optimal contract between Chorus and CFH (government). The whole UFB 
project could be divided into three main stages- the network design stage, the network 
building stage and service operation stage. In the planning stage, either the government 
could deliver the whole integrated UFB package to Chorus or it could contract out one or 
two phases of the whole project to Chorus and leave the rest to another company. It seems 
that there exist positive externalities among the various UFB stages, which induces the 
government to hand over the whole package to Chorus. Besides, the ownership matters in 
our case since the company has some flexibility regarding the technology used to build the 
network. In the roll-out process, there are various technologies available to Chorus. For 
example, either Chorus can choose to put fibre cables on power poles or they can bury fibre 
cables underground. The former cuts the building cost but raises the maintenance costs 
which may be undesirable from the perspective of social welfare, while the latter one rises 
the building cost but is far easier to maintain which may enhance social welfare.
26
 The 
ownership in this case should be allocated to the private sector since, by internalizing the 
inter-stage externality, it induces Chorus to put more cables underground and less cables 
overhead therefore increasing the social welfare. 
3.2 The literature review of PPPs in the scope of real options analysis 
Flexibility allows investment decision makers to update their investment decisions as new 
information arrives, which helps them to take advantage of new opportunities and/or to 
alleviate actual or potential losses. The key idea of real options analysis is to value the 
managerial flexibility of real assets with the application of option concepts. The quantitative 
origins of real options analysis derive from the seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1973) in pricing financial options. A decision-tree approach introduced by Cox, 
Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) highly simplifies the option valuation in discrete-time. This 
valuation method is the one used in this thesis. Over the years, the real option theory has 
been significantly developed by numerous scholars (such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
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 That is we compare it to the more incomplete contract settings such as, Hart et al. (1997) and Bennett and 
Iossa’s (2006). 
26
 The increase of social welfare is based on the assumption that the savings in maintenance cost dominate 
the savings in building cost. 
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Trigeorgis (1996), Amram and Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and Antikarov (2001) and 
Guthrie (2009)).
27
  
Real options analysis has been applied to study the infrastructure projects (such as Ford, 
Lander and Voyer (2002), Garvin and Cheah (2004) and Grimes (2011)). In the general real 
option literature, real options analysis is considered to be applicable if the following criteria 
are met. First, the investment is at least partly irreversible, which is normally true for the 
project involving specified infrastructure investment (in the UFB roll-out,  a large portion of  
infrastructure and device investment are technology specific, which is definitely not full 
recoverable). Second, the project should involve uncertainty which may eventually affect the 
project‟s net present value (in the UFB case, the net present value of the project is affected 
by both demand uncertainty and cost uncertainty). Third, the cost to utilise flexibility cannot 
be too high. For example, if abandonment is too costly, it is unlikely that the firm will 
exercise the abandonment option, which renders the flexibility to abandon of little value. In 
the UFB project, the associated costs for Chorus to defer or abandon the infrastructure 
construction are limited. 
Over the past two decades, many researchers have applied real options analysis to conduct 
evaluation of PPP projects. Rose (1998) uses Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the values 
of two separate options (the first option entitles the government to reduce the “concession 
period” and the second one grants the concessionaire the deferral of the “concession fee” to 
the government), and more important, the value of their “interacting effect” in the 
Melbourne CityLink Project. Focusing on the same project (Melbourne CityLink Project), 
Alonso-Conde, Brown and Rojo-Suarez (2007) not only estimate the values of relevant 
options but also highlight a non-monotonic relationship between these options and changes 
in volatility. Liu and Cheah (2009) value both a guarantee (the government guarantees the 
minimum level of revenue flow to the concessionaire) and a cap (the government caps the 
highest level of return for the concessionaire) in a wastewater treatment plant located in 
Southern China through Monte Carlo simulations. As a result of their valuation, the 
negotiation bands for both the initial transfer price (with a fixed normal tariff) and the 
normal rate of tariff (with a fixed transfer price) could be created. Shan, Garvin and Kumar 
(2010) illustrate how to determine the strike prices of a collar option (which combines a call 
and put option) in a real toll PPP transportation project. Liu, Yu and Cheah (2014) evaluate 
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 A nice summary about the real option literature could be found in Trigeorgis (1993). 
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the guarantee of restrictive competition (an option that the concessionaire may require the 
government to limit similar projects in the same area of the original infrastructure project) in 
a PPP highway project in Nanjing, China. 
Using real options analysis, some authors focus on the incentive scheme design that aligns 
the public and private interests in a PPP project. Rocha Armada, Pereira and Rodrigues 
(2012) present four kinds of incentive schemes (an investment subsidy that reduces the 
investment cost, a revenue subsidy that increases the value of the underlying cash flows, a 
minimum demand guarantee and a rescue option that reduce the demand uncertainty) that 
could be optimally arranged by the government to induce the concessionaire to invest early 
on PPPs infrastructure projects.
28
 Although the net costs of these incentive schemes are 
always negative and equal to the value of the option to defer, they produce different time 
patterns of the cash flows for the government, which imply that the choice of the types of 
incentives may be determined by the degree of government commitment to future 
generations of taxpayers. Besides, they show that a rescue option that allows the 
concessionaire to recover a fraction of the initial investment through abandoning the project 
is not common in PPPs due to its extremely high fraction of recovery requirement for certain 
demand levels.
29
 Chen and Qin (2012) suggest that a real option incentive scheme (which is 
combined by a continuation option and an abandonment option) could be offered by the 
government to the concessionaire to improve revenue management in PPP projects. More 
interesting, they show that not only the premium of the real option incentive scheme can 
finance possible capacity expansions but also the real option incentive scheme can motivate 
the concessionaire to increase the investment in quality improvement. 
The previous real option studies mainly focused on the evaluation of managerial flexibility 
in PPP projects. Although the incentive schemes and the concessionaire‟s investment 
behaviors have been studied by some people, the decision flexibility featured in their models 
is very limited, and more important, the decision flexibility has never been granted to the 
government,
30
 which may not be theoretically optimal. 
 
                                                          
28
 They assume that from the government’s perspective, it is always optimal to invest immediately. Therefore, 
the conflict increases only when the concessionaire has an incentive to delay investment. 
29 
They claim  the fraction recovered needs to be significantly higher than 100% for certain demand levels 
30
 In Rocha Armada, Pereira and Rodrigues (2012)’s study, they simply assume the government always prefers 
immediate investment and the private concessionaire can only decide the timing of investment. In Chen and 
Qin (2012)’s study, the government’s decision on capacity remains unchanged over time. 
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Chapter 4: The structure for basic model 
4.1 The objective functions 
In this thesis, one of the main research goals is identifying the potential conflicts between 
public and private parties. Since conflicts may arise if different parties have different 
economic interests, we need to specify both parties‟ objective functions. In the UFB project, 
as a private sector manufacturer, Chorus may try to maximize the present value of its 
economic profits and therefore will care about only the producer surplus (PS) and the capital 
expenditures of the UFB project. CFH, as a representative of government, will care about the 
present value of total surplus (customer surplus plus the producer surplus) and the capital 
expenditures instead since the social welfare maximization should be its main 
consideration.
31
  
For a standard telecommunication project, a large amount of capital expenditure normally 
occurs in the infrastructure construction period, and compared to the revenue, the operating 
cost to run the facility is negligible. Therefore, in any post-construction point, we may 
assume that both construction and operational expenditures are zero. (The construction cost 
is omitted as a sunk cost for post-construction period, while the operating cost is omitted due 
to its size relative to revenue.)  
For a given linear demand function, what should be the specified function of customer 
surplus and producer surplus? 
At graph 4.1, the fibre contract price is  ̂ .32 The red triangle area CDE is the consumer 
surplus flow at date   when there have been   down moves and     up moves in the 
binomial tree that describes how demand changes over time, which we label as  (   ). The 
blue rectangle area ABCD is the producer surplus flow at date   when there have been   
down moves and     up moves, which we label as  (   ).  
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 To simplify, we make an assumption that principal-agent problem does not exist between CFH and 
government therefore CFH is the social planner.  
32
 To simplify, we assume the fibre contract price  ̂ is constant over time. This assumption is quite realistic 
since the fibre contract prices specified in the UFB project do not change until 2015. Besides, even though the 
prices of different fibre service packages are going to be changing after 2015, the average price is constant 
over time. 
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Graph 4.1: The functions for demand and supply flows of the UFB Project  
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This constant ratio guarantees that  (   ) is proportional to the square of  (   ), which 
simplifies the modelling for the consumer surplus. In the following sections, we use the 
constant ratio 
 
   
  to measure the relative important of consumer and producer surpluses, 
which we label as    . 
4.2 Model cities 
In our model, four cities have been formed to study the differences of choices between 
Chorus and CFH. The demand and construction expenditure are the features we use to make 
cities different. Specifically, we apply a demand multiplier (DR) to the producer surplus of a 
standard city to form a high demand city, while we apply a cost multiplier (CR) to the 
construction expenditure of a standard city to form a high cost city. DR may be sourced from 
the difference of population density across the UFB coverage area, while CR may be sourced 
from the different fibre deployment technology that could be applied across the UFB 
coverage area. The details of the four cities are provided below. 
City HL (High demand and low capital expenditure): 
This city has high demand on the fibre network and the expenditure needed to build the fibre 
network is low. At date  , when there are   down moves, the per-period flow of producer 
surplus (that is, revenue) of this city will equal    (   ). However, for CFH, the per-
period flow of total surplus will equal ,    (   )       (   )- .33  
City HH (High demand and high capital expenditure):  
This city has high demand on the fibre network and the expenditure needed to build the fibre 
network is high. At date  , when there are   down moves, the per-period flow of producer 
surplus of this city will equal     (   ). However, for CFH, the per-period flow of total 
surplus will equal  ,    (   )       (   )- .  
City LL (Low demand and low capital expenditure):  
This city has low demand on the fibre network and the expenditure needed to build the fibre 
network is low. At date  , when there are   down moves, the per-period flow of producer 
surplus of this city will equal    (   ). However, for CFH, the per-period flow of total 
surplus will equal   , (   )   (   )- .  
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 This is consistent with equation 1. That is, 
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City LH (Low demand and high capital expenditure):  
This city has low demand on the fibre network and the expenditure needed to build the fibre 
network is high. At date  , when there are   down moves, the per-period flow of producer 
surplus of this city will equal    (   ). However, for CFH, the per-period flow of total 
surplus will equal   , (   )   (   )- .  
The above descriptions specify the revenue function for each city. However, before we can 
go further, we need to define our cost function for the basic model. Let     (           ) 
denote the construction expenditure in each construction period, where 
    (           )      (        (     ))
  
         and    represents how many construction periods are going to be finished for each 
city in this period, where the subscript       and   stand for city HL, city HH, city LL and 
city LH respectively. In our basic model, there is only one construction period for building 
each city, therefore the values of           and    here will be either 0 or 1. The marginal cost 
function is increasing over the number of cities to be built. For example, if we only build a 
low cost city (HL or LL),     (       )      (       )   , or if we only build a high cost 
city (HH or LH),     (       )      (       )    (  ) . However, if we build up a high 
cost city and a low cost city together,     (       )      (       )      (       )  
    (       )     (    ) , where    (    )    (         )    (     ) 
(the case that two cities have been built separately) due to the existence of the extra term 
      . The extra term in the inequality explains the source of increasing marginal cost. In 
reality, this extra term may come from the various constraints that the party faces. For 
example, if there is a limited local labour market in this country, the party may incur an extra 
cost to build up two cities together rather than building them up separately. This is because, 
when facing a limited local labour market, the firm may need to hire someone else from 
overseas to join the construction, which often incurs additional cost. The cases of building 
up three cities and four cities together are quite similar to our two cities case.  
4.3 The model setting-up 
The government (CFH) gives a firm (Chorus) a PPP contract that allows the private firm to 
build up the UFB network in four nominated cities. At each period, the firm has flexibilities 
to choose both which of the cities it wants to build and when it wants to build them. In the 
version of the model considered in this chapter, all construction required to roll out fibre to a 
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single city can be completed in one period. We will see that this significantly simplifies the 
analysis. Construction costs   to roll out fibre to a single standard city and       to roll out 
fibre to a single high cost city. Multiple cities can be completed in a single period, but the 
firm incurs extra construction costs. The whole UFB project can be suspended or resumed 
without cost. However, the development right expires after   years. 
There are two state variables in our model.
34
 The first state variable, (   ), denotes a single 
period revenue for a standard city at date   if exactly   down moves and     up moves have 
occurred since date 0.
 35
 Equation 2 is the formula we use to generate the state 
variable  (   ).  
 (   )       
    
    ( )   
The     year lifetime of the UFB construction period is divided into a sequence of      
periods in our basic model. Therefore the time measure for each step    
 
 
     equals   
(which is the time to build up one city measured by year) in our basic model. However, we 
will have the smaller time step    to make our general model more accurate.   is a constant 
growth factor when there has been one down move during this period, while    is a constant 
growth factor when there has been one up move during this period. The starting value    is 
the revenue for this standard city today (at date 0).  
 The second state variable,  (   ), denotes a single period consumer surplus for a standard 
city at date   if exactly   down moves and     up moves have occurred since date 0. 
Similarly, we have equation 3 for  (   ). 
        (   )        
     
 (   ) ( )  
The starting value     is the consumer surplus for this standard city at the date 0, which 
equals        
 .    
  and   
  are the constant growth factor squares. 
Besides, there are several important parameters.   is the annual standard deviation of the 
state variable, which we used to model the volatility.    is the sum of 1 and the risk free rate, 
which we use for discounting the cash flow in each period. In order to apply the risk neutral 
pricing formula,    and    have been introduced here as the risk neutral probabilities of up 
and down moves occurring in the next period respectively, where    
    
     
  and      
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 According to our setting in section 4.1, there is only one independent state variable since  (   ) and 
 (   ) are perfectly correlated.  
35
 The standard areas we mean here are those areas with standard demand for UFB, in contrast to High 
demand areas, where the demand for UFB is higher than the standard area. 
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  .
36
   is the sum of 1 and the annual risk-adjusted growth rate.
37
 The parameter      
     
    
, is the present value of the perpetual revenue stream of  (   ), starting at  (   )  
  .
38
 The parameter     
      
    (    
      
 )
, is the present value of the perpetual consumer 
surplus cash flow stream of   (   ), starting at  (   )      .
39
 The baseline values of all our 
parameters are reported at table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Parameter values for the basic model 
Parameter                        Symbol      Value 
a) Real world parameter                  
Annual demand Volatility        0.15 
Present value for   *           8.5 
Present value for    *           5.7 
Total capital expenditure*        10 
Expected growth rate        0.07 
Annual risk-free interest rate        0.015 
UFB contract duration (measured by year)     6  
UFB contract period N  12 
Cost ratio         2 
Demand ratio         3 
the constant multiplier between consumer and 
producer surpluses 
         4 
b) Model parameter   
Time for each period         0.5 
Time to build up one city (measured by year)        0.5 
Per-period risk adjusted growth factor              
Per-period growth factor (up)                
Per-period growth factor (down)                
Per-period risk-neutral probability (up)                
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 For more detail see chapter 3, Guthrie (2009).  
37
 In our model, when calculating present values of cash flow streams we adjust for risk via the numerator 
rather than the denominator.  here is the risk-adjusted growth factor which we use to adjust for risk. It 
differs from the actual growth factor     by including a risk-adjusted effect, which normally makes it 
smaller than the actual growth factor. After multiplying the expected cash flow by the risk-adjusted growth 
factor K, the risky cash flow could be treated as a risk-free cash flow, therefore a risk-free discount rate could 
be applied to discount the expected cash flow, where  
   
  (   )
. 
38
 Chorus receive a perpetual cash flow X(i, n) from a completed standard city in each period, where    is the 
initial value of  (   ). 
39
 CFH receive a perpetual cash flow V(i, n) from a completed standard city in each period , where     is the 
initial value of  (   ). 
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Per-period risk-neutral probability (down)                
Current revenue*                
Current consumer surplus*                 
Per-period risk-free interest factor                
*These values are only for a standard city 
 
4.4 Decision tree 
 A decision tree has been constructed in graph 4.2 in order to analyse our basic model. At 
date 0, Chorus has completed no cities (category A, which is the yellow rectangle in graph 
4.2) and must choose between constructing a network in one or more cities and waiting. If 
the firm chooses to construct one or more networks at date 0, then it needs to choose one 
specified decision from 15 construction choices.
40
 We can see from graph 4.2, at date 1, 
these 15 construction choices will make the firm into four different state categories—four 
construction choices (therefore four states in date 1) are in category B (to build one city 
between date 0 and 1, which is the orange rectangle in graph 4.2), six construction choices 
(therefore six states in date 1) are in category C (to build two cities between date 0 and 1, 
which is the green rectangle in graph 4.2) , four construction choices (therefore four states in 
date 1)  are in category D (to build three cities between date 0 and 1, which is the blue 
rectangle in graph 4.2) and one construction choice (therefore one state in date 1)  is in the 
category E (to build four cities between date 0 and 1, which is the purple rectangle in graph 
4.2). According to its adopted construction policy, the firm pays the corresponding costs 
immediately and receives the corresponding revenues from one period later onwards. At date 
1, the firm will have the right to develop the remaining cities, but the remaining lifetime of 
the contract will be one period shorter. If, instead, the firm chooses to wait, then at date 1 it 
will be in category A and still have the right to develop all four cities, and again the 
remaining lifetime of the contract will be one period shorter. 
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 There will be    choices for the firm since we have four different cities and two available decisions for each 
city. However, we exclude the option of waiting thereby only         decision left. 
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Graph 4.2: Decision tree for the basic model 
 
Therefore, the project will be in one of sixteen states at date 1, depending on what policy has 
been adopted by Chorus at date 0. The firm reaches the terminal node and the contract ends 
if Chorus finishes all four cities (which is category E). Otherwise, the firm must be in one of 
the four following state categories in date 1 and it needs to choose between constructing and 
waiting again. 
 State category D (Shaded with blue colour): There is only one remaining city for the firm 
to develop now since three have been finished in the past. Therefore, there are four different 
states
 
 in this category. Which state the firm faces in this category, depends on which of 
those three cities have been finished in the past. No matter which state the firm is in, now, 
the firm must choose either to build up the last city or to wait. 
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State category C (Shaded with green colour): There are two remaining cities for the firm to 
develop now since the other two have been finished. Therefore, there are six different states 
in this category. Which state the firm faces in this category depends on which of those two 
cities have been finished. No matter which state the firm is in, now, the firm must choose 
from building up the last two cities, building up one city or waiting.  The choice of building 
up one city has two different policies available. 
State category B (Shaded with orange colour): There are three remaining cities for the firm 
to develop now since only one has been finished. Therefore, there are four different states in 
this category. Which states the firm faces in this category, depends on which city has been 
finished. No matter which state the firm is in, the firm must choose from building the last 
three cities, building two cities, building one city or waiting. Building up two cities and 
building up one city each has three different policies available. 
State category A (Shaded with yellow colour): There are four remaining cities for the firm 
to develop now since no city has been finished yet. Therefore, there is only one state in this 
category. The firm must choose from building all four cities, building three cities, building 
two cities, building one city or waiting. Building up two cities and building up one city each 
has four different policies available, building up four cities and waiting each has one policy 
available, building up two cities has six different policies available. In total, there will be 
sixteen different policies available for this state. 
If Chorus chooses to construct in the above states, the firm pays the corresponding costs at 
date 1 and starts to receive the corresponding revenues one period later, depending on which 
state category it is and which policy it adopts. At date 2, the firm will have the right to 
develop the remaining cities, but the remaining lifetime of the contract will be one period 
shorter. If, instead, the firm chooses to wait, then at date 2 it will still be where it was, with 
the same development right as before, and again the remaining lifetime of the contract will 
be one period shorter.  
This argument could be applied to further dates as well, so our decision tree continues to 
evolve in this way until either of two situations happens: the development right expires, or 
construction in all four cities is completed. At that point no more decisions need to be made 
by the firm and all future cash flows can be valued without the need for decision trees. 
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To make our decision tree clearer, we describe a specified case that the firm is in the state 
*       + at date 1. That is, it has already completed city LL and LH. This will be the point Z 
in our graph 4.2. At that node, there are four remaining construction decisions for the firm to 
choose from—*       +, *       +, *       + and *       +. If the firm chooses *       +, it is 
going to finish city HL and city HH in the next period, moving it to the terminal state 
*       + at date 2 (point J in graph 4.2). If the firm chooses *       +, it is going to finish 
city HL and will be in state *       + in date 2 (point E in graph 4.2). If the firm 
chooses *       +, it is going to build city HH and will be in state *       + in date 2 (point F 
in graph 4.2). In contrast, if the firm chooses *       + (waiting), no construction will happen 
and the firm will stay at state *       + in date 2 (point V in graph 4.2).                                     
4.5 Valuation process  
In this section, we are going to describe how to calculate the present values of the UFB 
contract. As the decision tree in graph 4.2 makes clear, excluding the state *       +) , we 
need to build a present value tree for each state. There are fifteen uncompleted states 
therefore fifteen present value trees in each of our valuation processes. Since we are 
interested in identifying the potential conflicts between Chorus and CFH, we need to 
estimate not only the present values of the UFB contract for both parties under their own 
optimal  policies (Chorus and CFH), but also the present value of the UFB contract for CFH 
under Chorus‟ optimal policy. Therefore, we separate this section into three parts. 
4.5.1 Valuation process for Chorus (Chorus optimal policy) 
Let  (    *       +) denotes the present value of the UFB contract for Chorus at the node 
(   ) when the firm is in state *       +, where       and   equal the numbers of construction 
periods that have been completed in HL, HH, LH and LL cities respectively. Since all the 
cities in our basic model take one period to complete, the values of       and   will be either 
0 or 1, where 1 means that the city has been finished and vice versa for 0. For example, 
 (    *       +) represents the present value of the UFB contract for Chorus at the node 
(   ) when the firm has already finished both the HL and HH cities. 
 If no city has been completed at the expiry date N then the UFB contract has no value, so 
that 
 (    *       +)     
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at all nodes (   ). 
Now consider the more general case where either Chorus has built up a fibre network in 
some cities or it has not started yet. From date N onwards the development right is worthless 
since the right to develop has expired. However, the firm still receives revenue from those 
completed cities in each post N period. Therefore              
 (    *       +)  
   (    *       +)
    
 41 
      (    *       +)  ,  (   )  (   )- (   ) ( ) 
for all          . At each earlier date, Chorus must choose between constructing and 
waiting. If it decides to wait, then there is cash flow from cities already completed at date  , 
and at date     the present value of the fibre contract will be  (      *       +) if an up 
move occurs and  (        *       +) if a down move occurs. The payoff from waiting is 
therefore   
 (    *       +)  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 ( )  
In contrast, if Chorus chooses to construct, it is in one of four categories below at date  , 
depending on the values of       and  . 
State category D (when the state indicator *       + equals *       +, *       +, *       + or 
*       +): 
For example, if Chorus is in the state *       +, there is only one remaining city for it to 
construct at date   (which is city HL), hence it pays     (       ) and immediately 
receives  (    *       +), where  
    (       )      
    (    *       +)   (   )  (     )  
At date     , the UFB contract will be worth  (      *       +) if an up move occurs and 
 (        *       +) if a down move occurs. The payoff to Chorus from constructing in 
state *       + is therefore 
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 For more detail see chapter 4, Guthrie (2009). 
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 (    *       +)      (       )
 
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
  
From equation 5, we learn that the payoff to Chorus from waiting in state *       + should be 
 (    *       +)  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
   
Since Chorus must choose between constructing city HL and waiting when it is in this state, 
it should adopt whichever action has the higher payoff, so that the present value of the UFB 
contract for Chorus at node (   ) equals 
 (    *       +)
    
{
 
 
 
  (    *       +)  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 
 (    *       +)      (       )  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  }
 
 
 
 
( )  
The evaluations for all other states in category D follow the same process as state *       +.  
State category C (when the state indicator *       + equals *       +, *       +, *       +, 
*       +, *       + or *       +): 
Similarly, we use one of the specified states to demonstrate the evaluation process in this 
category. For example, if Chorus is in the state *       +, there are two remaining cities for 
the firm to construct at date  , hence it can choose from the following three actions—pay 
    (       ) to build up city HL, pay     (       ) to build up city HH or pay 
    (       ) to build up two city together. No matter which decision Chorus makes it 
immediately receives  (    *       +), where  
    (       )         (       )            (       )   (    )    
    (    *       +)   (   )     
If Chorus chooses to construct city HL only, at date     , the UFB contract will be worth 
 (      *       +) if an up move occurs and  (        *       +) if a down move occurs. 
The payoff to Chorus from constructing city HL is therefore 
 (    *       +)      (       )
 
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
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However, if Chorus chooses to construct city HH only, at date     , the UFB contract will 
be worth  (      *       +) if an up move occurs and  (        *       +) if a down 
move occurs. The payoff to Chorus from constructing city HH is therefore 
 (    *       +)      (       )
 
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
  
Besides, if Chorus chooses to construct both cities together, at date     , the UFB contract 
will be worth  (      *       +) if an up move occurs and  (        *       +) if a down 
move occurs. The payoff to Chorus from constructing city HL is therefore 
 (    *       +)      (       )
 
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 
From equation 5, we learn that the payoff to Chorus from waiting in state *       + should be 
 (    *       +)  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
   
Since the firm must choose from constructing city HL, constructing city HH, constructing 
both cities and waiting, it should adopt whichever action has the higher payoff, so that the 
present value of the UFB contract for Chorus at node (   ) equals 
 (    *       +)
    
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (    *       +)  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 
 (    *       +)      (       )  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 
 (    *       +)      (       )  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  
 
 (    *       +)      (       )  
  (   ) (      *       +)    (   ) (        *       +)
  }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )  
The evaluations for all other states in category C follow the same process as state *       +.  
State category B (when the state indicator *       + equals *       +, *       +, *       + 
or *       +):  
The payoffs of each construction action could be created in a same way as above; therefore 
we do not list them all here. Since the firm must choose from seven constructing actions and 
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one waiting action, it should adopt whichever action has the higher payoff, so that the 
present value of the UFB contract for Chorus at node (   ) equals 
 (    *       +)
    {
                                                                  *       + 
                                                     *       +                                    
} ( )  
The evaluations for all other states in category B follow the same process as state *       +.  
State category A (when the state indicator *       + equals *       +): 
If the firm is in this category, it will face all sixteen choices. Rather than list them all here, 
we just note that they are similar to those in equation 7, where 
 (    *       +)
    {
                                                                  *       + 
                                                     *       +                                    
} ( )  
Actually, the general evaluation formula for all categories will be  
 (    *       +)
    {
                                                                  *       + 
                                                     *       +                                    
} (  )  
This equation, together with the terminal condition (equation 4), completely determines the 
present value of the UFB contract for Chorus at date 0. 
4.5.2 Valuation process for CFH (CFH optimal policy) 
Let  (    *       +) denote the present value of the UFB contract for CFH assuming that 
CFH chooses its own policy at the node (   ) when the state of construction is *       +, 
where       and   equal the numbers of construction periods that have been finished in cities 
HL, HH, LH and LL cities respectively. Similar to our valuation of Chorus, the values of 
      and    here will be either 0 or 1 as well, where 1 means that the city has been finished 
and vice versa for 0. The evaluation process to CFH is almost the same as the evaluation 
process for Chorus; therefore we are not going to repeatedly list it here. The only difference 
we make to the valuation process for CFH is that we include consumer surplus in CFH‟s 
payoffs. For example, if the state of construction is *       + at date  , the flow of surplus 
that CFH receives should have  (    *       +) equalled to ,(    )  (   )  (     )  
 (   )- rather than  (   )(    )  
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4.5.3 Valuation process for CFH (Chorus optimal policy) 
Since we want to compare the overall welfare when Chorus makes the investment decisions 
with the overall welfare when CFH makes the investment decisions (which we have done at 
section 4.5.2), we mix CFH‟s objective function with Chorus‟ optimal decisions in this 
section. Let  (    *       +) denote the present value of the UFB contract to CFH under 
Chorus‟ optimal policy at the node (   ) when the state of construction is *       +, where 
      and   have the same meaning as in the previous section. The valuation process will be 
quite similar to that in section 4.5.2 (under CFH‟s optimal policy). However, the 
maximization process among different policies (equation 8) could be ignored here since the 
CFH will follow exactly the same policy as Chorus. Therefore, we just need to learn Chorus‟ 
specified policy at each node. For example, if waiting is the adopted policy at node (   ) in 
state *       + and then we can get the present value at that point  (    *       +) from 
estimating the payoff function corresponding to that specified policy (the payoff to CFH at 
node (   ) if it chooses to wait in next period). 
4.6 Results for basic model 
4.6.1 Conflicts between Chorus and CFH 
In our model, there are two sorts of conflicts between Chorus and CFH. A) The conflict of 
construction timing, in which Chorus and CFH may have different opinions about choosing 
when to construct the fibre network (parties disagree on whether construction is optimal in 
the next period). B) The conflict of construction sequence, in which the two parties may 
have different ideas about choosing the construction order among different cities (they 
consider construction in the next period is optimal but disagree about which city should go 
next). We would like to apply our numerical example to demonstrate these two conflicts. All 
values of parameters for our numerical example can be found at table 4.1. Any modification 
will be notified. 
We provide the most interesting information about the optimal construction policies for both 
Chorus and CFH at table 4.2 and table 4.3 respectively. We only report the information 
about the first six periods due to the limited space (there are twelve periods in total). 
Specifically, these tables describe the optimal policies once city HL has been finished. Both 
parties are deciding when, and what, to build next. Every cell at table 4.2 or table 4.3 
represents the adopted construction behaviour of the underlying party corresponding to the 
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node (   ). For example, the first entry at table 4.2 is *       +, which means that Chorus 
would like to wait at node (   ).  
Table 4.2: Chorus’s optimal policy at state (1, 0, 0, 0) 
 
Table 4.3: CFH’s optimal policy at state (1, 0, 0, 0) 
 
A) The conflict of construction timing 
The conflicts of construction timing could be identified from comparing table 4.2 and table 
4.3, which are highlighted by yellow boxes. For example, if CFH and Chorus are in state (1, 
0, 0, 0) during date 0 to date 2, there is a timing conflict between two parties if the current 
state is not too bad. (That is, not all the past moves are down moves) At date 3, the timing 
conflict only disappears if at least 2 down moves have occurred in the past. However, at date 
4, the threshold for the timing conflict to be able to disappear has extended to at least 3 down 
moves having occurred in the past. At date 5, the timing conflict does not show up when 
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there have been 5 up moves or there have been at least 3 down moves. At date 6, the timing 
conflict vanishes when there have been 5 up moves or there have been at least 4 down moves. 
B) The conflict of construction sequence 
In contrast, we highlight the sequencing conflicts by red boxes. As we may find in table 4.2 
and table 4.3, the sequencing conflict only exists when the current level of demand is high.
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For example, at date 5 and date 6, the sequencing conflict only shows up when there have 
been more than four up moves.  
4.6.2 The consequences of conflict 
If CFH works in the best interests of society as a whole, its optimal policy will maximise 
social welfare. Therefore, any policy which deviates from CFH‟s optimal policy may bring a 
potential social welfare loss (the present value of conflict), where these welfare losses may 
be raised either from an undersupply in the UFB network during certain periods
43
 or an 
incorrect priority policy among different cities.
44
 And it will be useful to measure the 
potential social welfare losses from the adopted suboptimal policies. In our numerical 
example, we apply equation 11 and equation 12 to calculate the present value of social 
welfare loss and the proportion of conflict respectively. 
                              (    *       +)   (    *       +)(  ) 
                             
 (    *       +)
 (    *       +)
                                         (  )  
Where  (    *       +) is the present value of the UFB contract for CFH at state *       + 
under CFH‟s optimal policy (therefore in the view of society, it is the maximised present 
value of social welfare raised from the UFB project), and  (    *       +) is the present 
value of the UFB contract for CFH at state *       + under Chorus‟s optimal policy. 
(Therefore in the view of society, it is only one of the social welfare present values rather 
than the maximum.)This present value may be equal to or smaller than the maximum 
depending on whether Chorus‟s optimal policy is the same as CFH‟s. If state *       + is 
                                                          
42
 It does not mean high demand always bring sequencing conflicts. For example, at date 5, when there have 
been five up moves, a timing conflict rather than a sequencing conflict shows up since the demand is high 
enough to induce CFH to build up both city HH and city LL once. 
43
 The firm may work too slowly to provide enough supply to meet the social demand. 
44
 For saving the cost, the firm may give priority to the low cost city instead of the high cost city, even though 
the high cost city has a higher total surplus than that of the low cost city. 
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equal to *       +, we have Table 4.4 for  (    *       +) and Table 4.5 for  (    *       +) 
respectively. 
Table 4.4: Present value of UFB for CFH under Chorus policy at state (0, 0, 0, 0) 
 
Table 4.5: Present value of UFB for Chorus under Chorus policy at state (0, 0, 0, 0) 
 
The present values of social welfare under two different policies have been highlighted by 
yellow boxes. With equation 11 and 12, we find the present value of welfare loss and 
proportion of conflict equal 29 and 0.274 respectively. 
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Chapter 5: The general model setting-up 
5.1 A shift from the basic model to the general model 
In our basic model, we assume that the construction of a fibre network in any single city can 
be completed in one period. This implies that the construction process cannot be interrupted 
or sped up, so that both parties have no flexibility after launching the fibre roll-out in 
individual cities. Although this assumption dramatically simplifies our model, it may be too 
simple to be realistic since the firm may actually have some flexibility during the 
construction period, especially for such a complicated project
45
. Besides, allowing more 
periods to build up one city implies that there will be a smaller    to make our model more 
accurate. Last but not least, since more flexibility has been allocated to the private party, the 
general model give us more levels of contract incompleteness to study. Actually, with the 
single period model, the lump sum subsidy and fixed period subsidy will have the same 
effects in motivating the private firm to follow the public party‟s optimal policy since 
suspension and speed-up options are unavailable. Therefore, we should consider a more 
general case, in which every city requires more than one period to finish. 
In order to allow multiple-period construction, we keep   (UFB contract duration) 
unchanged but reduce the time measure for each step   . Although a smaller    will result in 
a more accurate result, the increase of the number of periods to build exponentially increases 
the time for calculation during programing. Therefore, to have a more accurate estimation 
but avoid the explosion of calculations, we only reduce    from 0.5 to 0.25 in our general 
model. That is, we cap the number of periods to build up one city at two, which suggests that 
the firm maximally spend two periods to finish the fibre network construction in each city. 
Apart from this, several parameters for the general model are changed from the basic model. 
We report the values of all parameters for the general model in Table 5.1.  
 
 
                                                          
45
 Since flexibility is always valuable, it is costly for CFH to take all flexibilities away from Chorus during the 
fibre network roll-out. Besides, it may not be in CFH’s best interest to exclude both the suspension option and 
the speed-up option during fibre construction because they may want to exercise these options in certain 
states as well. The complexity of the project may make it technologically infeasible for CFH to exclude the 
company’s suspension and speed-up options during the construction period. This is because, in order to 
exclude any potential suspension, CFH needs to have perfect information about the states of all cities (which 
city is HL, which city is HH, etc.), which is the firm’s private information. 
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Table 5.1: Parameter values for the two-period model 
Parameter                        Symbol      Value 
a) Real world parameter                  
Annual demand Volatility        0.15 
Present value for   *           8.5 
Present value for    *           2.87 
Total capital expenditure *        10 
Expected growth rate        0.07 
Annual risk-free interest rate               
UFB contract duration (measured by year)     6  
UFB contract period N   24 
Cost ratio         2 
Demand ratio         3 
the constant multiplier between consumer and 
producer surpluses 
         4 
b) Model parameter   
Time for each period         0.25 
Time to build up one city (measured by year) Y      0.5 
Per-period capital expenditure       5 
Per-period risk adjusted growth factor        0.997 
Per-period growth factor (up)         1.078 
Per-period growth factor (down)         0.928 
Per-period risk-neutral probability (up)         0.456 
Per-period risk-neutral probability (down)         0.544 
Current revenue*               
Current consumer surplus*                 
Per-period risk-free interest factor         1.004 
*These values are only for a standard city 
 
5.2 Decision table for two-period model 
In practice, it is very difficult to draw the decision tree for multiple-period models due to the 
large number of actions available to the decision maker. In the case of the two-period model 
(the simplest multiple-period case), the players can choose from the following three kinds of 
option for each city that has not yet started its fibre roll out—finishing the first stage of 
construction for this city, finishing the whole construction for this city or waiting. 
Combining the four types of cities we have, there are       states in a two-period model 
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decision tree, which is very messy (the reader may compare it with the decision tree of our 
basic model (which has only 16 states) to imagine how messy the decision tree will be). To 
illustrate the possibilities, we illustrate the actions available once the constructions of two 
cities have been completed, meaning that the firm only needs to consider two remaining 
cities when it is making the decisions (There are only city HH (high demand city with high 
cost) and city LH (low demand city with high cost) left, which dramatically reduce the 
number of states from 81 to 9).
46
 Since the reduction of city number only exists to 
demonstrate the firm‟s decision marking, it does not affect the valuation and results of the 
general model.
47
 We summarize players‟ decisions in table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Decision table for two-period two cities model 
 {0,0} {0,1} {0,2} {1,0} {2,0} {1,1} {1,2} {2,1} {2,2} 
{0,0}          
{0,1}          
{0,2}          
{1,0}          
{2,0}          
{1,1}          
{1,2}          
{2,1}          
{2,2}          
 
In Table 5.2, each column represents the possible future states in the next period, while each 
row represents the possible current states. The first number in the bracket indicates the stage 
of construction for city HH, while the second number indicates the stage of construction for 
city LH. For example, {0, 0} in a row indicates that the player has started neither city at the 
current stage; {0, 0} in a column indicates that neither city will be started even in the next 
period. Ticks have been used to indicate the possible transitions between current states (row 
states) to corresponding future states (column states). Consider the following example. If the 
                                                          
46
 Since there are three choices that can be made for each city and two types of city left, the number of total 
states equals     . 
47
 Although we only provide the decision tree for the two-period two cities case since it is complicated enough, 
the decision tree for any more complicated models (Such as two-period four cities and three-period four cities, 
etc.) could be derived by the same method. 
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player is in the first row at date 0 (which is {0, 0}), he has not started any of these two cities, 
therefore one action he may take is waiting, which is the first tick; Or he may start to build 
up one of these two cities but not go full speed, which corresponds to the second tick if he is 
doing city LH or the fourth tick if he is doing city HH; Or he may start to build up one of 
these two cities with the full speed, which corresponds to the third tick if he is doing city LH 
or the fifth tick if he is doing city HH; Or he may start to build up both cities, which 
corresponds to the last four ticks (depending on different levels of speed). All above possible 
behaviours are motivated by the player‟s economics consideration. That is, by waiting, the 
player has a chance to observer whether the demand goes up or down; by investing in two 
stages at once (full speed), although the player incurs the higher capital expenditure, he can 
earn the revenues earlier. The player chooses its optimal behaviour according to the trade-off 
between capital expenditures and revenues. All his future states are determined by which 
transitions are taken from date 0 to date 1. 
Now assume the player already took the action {0, 1} at a previous period, hence he is in 
row 2 now. Once again, he can choose to wait to see whether demand goes up or down, 
which corresponds to the suspension option (the first tick in this column); or he can earn the 
revenues earlier by finishing city LH, which corresponds to the second tick in this row; or he 
may start city HH, which corresponds to the third tick if he only starts the first stage or the 
fifth tick if he is trying to finish both stages (which the player is exercising a speed-up 
option); or he may finish city LH and start city HH simultaneously, which corresponds to the 
fourth tick if he just starts the first stage of city HH or the sixth tick if he is working through 
both stages of city HH (once again, the player is choosing to exercise a speed-up option).As 
above, the optimal behaviour of the player  depends on the trade-off between its capital 
expenditures and revenues.  
Similarly, we can derive all possible transactions in row three, row four…, and row nine. 
The process continues until either the player complete all constructions (that is the ninth row 
{2, 2}) or the development right expires. At these points no more decisions need to be made 
by the firm and all future cash flows can be estimated without the decision table. 
5.3 The valuation process for the general model 
In this section, the valuation processes for the general model are introduced. Similar to that 
of the basic model, there are three valuation processes for the general model. That is the 
valuation process of the general model for Chorus (Chorus‟s optimal policy), valuation 
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process of the general model for CFH (CFH‟s optimal policy) and valuation process of the 
general model for CFH (Chorus‟s optimal policy). In practice, all three valuation processes 
have a few changes when we shift from the basic model to the general model. However, we 
only describe the detail of the valuation process for Chorus as we need these evaluation 
equations to introduce the add-on components of incentive tools in the next section. 
5.3.1 Valuation process of the general model for Chorus (Chorus optimal policy) 
In the general model, we still use  (    *       +) to denote the present value of the UFB 
contract for Chorus at the node (   ) when the firm is in the state *       +. However, in 
contrast to the basic case, the values of       and   will be 0, 1 or 2, where 2 means that both 
stages of this city have been finished, 1 means that only one stage of this city has been 
finished, while 0 means that none of the stages of this city has been done.  
As in the basic model, the terminal condition for the general model should equal either 
   (   *      +)
    
  or  
   (   *       +)
    
 ,
48
 which is equation 4.  
At any non-terminal node
49
, the present value of the UFB contract for the private party at 
node (   ) when the firm is in current state *       + equals, 
 (    *       +)
    { (    *       +)       (           )   
 
  (   ) (      *                   +)    (   ) (        *                   +)
  
} 
         (                  )               
                                                  (  )  
In this equation,   is the cash flow generated by the subsidy scheme, which we are going to 
introduce in the next section.  (    *       +) is the revenue the private party can receive 
during this period.      (           ) is the capital expenditure for the private party in this 
period.    indicates the number of construction stage undertaken for each city respectively 
during this period, with values ranging from 0 to                  (the number of stages 
                                                          
48
 In the case of both the simple fine scheme and two dimensional fine scheme introduced below, the 
terminal condition  
   (   *      +)
    
  switches to  
   (   *      +)
    
    . 
49
 At non-terminal condition, neither *       +  *       + nor    . 
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remaining to be completed for each city). For example, if each city takes two periods to be 
finished and the current state is *       +  *       +, the values of    will range from 0 to 1.  
For any given current state *       +, the private party will choose a combination of    (the 
optimal construction policy) that maximises the value of   (    *       +) . However, the 
public party can induce the private firm to change its combination of    by setting various  . 
Since   is only the monetary transfer between the public and private party, it does not 
directly affect the public party‟s evaluation formulas.50 The public party will try to find out 
the optimal   to maximise the value of  (    *       +), therefore minimizing the value 
of   (    *       +)   (    *       +), which is the present value of conflicts.
51
 
5.4 Optimal contracting  
In this section, we would like to introduce several incentive vehicles that help reduce the 
possible conflicts. The first sort of incentive vehicles we want to include will be the subsidy 
policies, which are the monetary transfers from one party to the other party in order to align 
their interests. Four levels of subsidy completeness have been studied in order to understand 
the effects of information asymmetry in the UFB case. Alternatively, two fine policies could 
be applied by the public party to discipline the private party in order to reduce their conflicts. 
Figuratively speaking, we may call the combination of subsidy and fine the carrot-and-stick 
approach, where the subsidy is the carrot and the fine is the stick. In the end, an optimal 
contract could be designed by combining all available incentive vehicles. 
5.4.1 An add-on of subsidy schemes for the general model 
1) Proportional subsidy policy description 
If the monetary transfer could be proportional to the private party‟s capital expenditure level, 
we call it a proportional subsidy. However, in order to apply a proportional subsidy scheme, 
the public party needs to have enough inside information about the private party, which 
means that the public party needs to learn both the capital expenditure of each possible 
                                                          
50
 As we know, there are two valuation processes for the public party, one is under the private firm’s optimal 
policy and the other is under the public party’s own optimal policy. However, the valuation formulas are the 
same except different optimal policies have been applied during the maximization process. This is because 
the goal of the social planner (public party) is maximizing the total surplus, therefore a monetary transfer 
between parties does not change the social planner’s utility function unless the tax distortion and agency cost 
for transfer are considered. However, we assume these two problems do not exist in our model. The tax 
distortion and agency cost on the subsidy in PPPs are discussed in Engle, Fischer and Galetovic (2007). 
51
 Since  (    *       +) is the first best condition, it will be constant for any given *       +. 
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transition and construction behaviours from the private firm.
52
 The first part tells them the 
value of each component for total capital expenditure, while the second part gives them the 
information about their possible combinations in each period.  
2) Proportional subsidy component add-on in evaluation formula 
In order to include the proportional subsidy into our general model evaluation, a proportional 
subsidy component needs to be introduced. That is,   equals     .     ( 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
)/ in 
equation 11, where    stands for the rate of proportional subsidy. 
3) Fixed period subsidy policy description 
If the public party is unable to observe the specified construction behaviour of the private 
firm, they cannot make the monetary transfer proportional to the private party‟s current 
capital expenditure level.
53
 Therefore, an efficient proportional subsidy is no longer available. 
In this case, we may need to look for a less complete contract, which is the fixed period 
subsidy policy. It does not require that the public party knows about the firm‟s actions 
specifically (Less information required). However, the public party still needs to learn how 
many construction stages have been finished by the private firm during the last period. This 
is because, although the level of fixed subsidy is irrelevant to the states of construction, it is 
proportional to the number of construction stage that has been finished. For example, if the 
state of construction*           +  *       +, a proportional subsidy policy may requires the 
public party to learn the values of all  
 
 , while a fixed subsidy policy only require the public 
party to know the sum of    rather than its specific values. In other words, unlike the 
proportional subsidy scheme, the fixed subsidy scheme does not require that the player is 
able to distinguish high and low cost cities. 
4) Fixed period subsidy component add-on in evaluation formula 
Similar to the proportional subsidy policy, we include a fixed subsidy component in our 
general model evaluation here. That is,   equals    ( 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
) in equation 12,     is 
a fixed level of monetary transfer from the public party to the private party for each finished 
city during this period, and the total level of fixed subsidy depends on the sum of  
 
 .  
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 The public party knows how much to construct each stage for each city. Besides, the firm cannot hide its 
behaviour from CFH. 
53
 If the public party cannot observe the specified construction behaviours, they cannot find out that how 
much money has been spent by the private firm during last period, which lefts the chance for the private firm 
to take advantage from the public party by “inflating” the capital expenditure. 
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5) Lump sum subsidy policies description 
If the public party cannot even observe how many construction stages have been finished by 
the private firm during each period, the fixed period subsidy policy is no longer available. In 
this case, a lump sum subsidy policy can be used. That is, the public party only makes a 
lump sum monetary transfer to the private party proportional to the number of cities that 
have been finished during each period. For example, if the current state *       +  
*       + at date 0, and the firm chooses the construction action  { 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
}  *       + 
(which means only city HL will be finished at date 1), CFH only needs to make the lump 
sum payment to Chorus for the completion of city HL at date 1. Alternatively, the public 
party is only required to verify the current state *       + during each period.
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 The 
construction state { 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
} becomes irrelevant in this case.  
Depending on whether CFH can identify the state of demand for each finished city, we 
introduce two sorts of lump sum subsidy schemes in our model. A) The independent lump 
sum subsidy scheme. B) The demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme. For the first 
subsidy scheme, the lump sum payment Chorus receives from each completed city is 
identical. While for the second subsidy scheme, the lump sum payment Chorus receives 
from a high demand city may be different from what it receives from a low demand city. 
6) The independent lump sum subsidy component add-on in evaluation formula 
Being different to the previous two subsidies, the independent lump sum subsidy cash flow 
occurs only once each city has been finished. That is,  
    
  
  
 (           ) 
,                                                                              
                                                                                  
                                                                              (  )  
   is the lump sum payment from the public party to the private firm for each finished city.
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 The verification occurs either in the terminal point or whenever the private firm report that they have 
finished the whole construction. As long as the public party can verify the final state of construction, the 
private firm will be honest about completeness of project. 
55
 The reason we discounted    by one period risk free rate is because the lump sum payment received by 
Chorus is one period late after the corresponding city finished. 
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7) The demand relevant lump sum subsidy component add-on in evaluation formula 
In the case of the demand relevant lump sum subsidy, the subsidy component includes two 
lump sum payments. That is, 
    
   
  
 (     )  
   
  
 (     ) 
,                                                                              
                                                                                  
                                                                              (  )  
    is the lump sum payment from the public party to the private firm for finishing a high 
demand city, while     is the lump sum payment from the public party to the private firm for 
finishing a low demand city. 
8)  The process of a comparison of subsidy schemes 
If all four subsidy schemes are available for the public party, CFH may need to know which 
one is the most socially desirable before they make decisions. Therefore, a comparison 
among subsidy schemes will be necessary. There are several processes for the comparison. 
First, we set up four general models, one for the proportional subsidy scheme, one for the 
fixed period subsidy scheme, and another two for the independent lump sum subsidy scheme 
and the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme respectively. We give all four models the 
same parameters but with different subsidy components (We use equation 11 to value the 
proportion subsidy case, equation 12 to value the fixed period subsidy case, equation 13 to 
value the independent lump sum subsidy case and equation 14 to value the demand relevant 
lump sum subsidy case). We vary the subsidy variable in each model to minimize the 
conflicts respectively.
56
 Third, we compare the minimum level of conflicts among all four 
subsidy schemes to see which one is the smallest. After that, we explain the corresponding 
differences in minimum conflict level with two conflict measures. 
5.4.2 An add-on of the fine schemes for the general model 
1) The description of fine policies 
                                                          
56
 That is    for the proportional subsidy scheme,    for the fixed subsidy scheme,    for the independent 
lump sum subsidy scheme and {       } for the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme. 
59 
 
In contrast, the public party may introduce a fine policy to discipline the private firm, 
therefore reducing the potential conflicts. That is, the public party will set up certain targets 
(Thresholds for the fines) for the private firm in the UFB project. If the private firm achieves 
the target on time, no fine would be surcharged by the public party, and vice versa. To keep 
the model simple, we start from a simple fine scheme that the public party will require the 
private firm to complete all four cities at date 24. If the firm does not achieve the targets, 
CFH could require Chorus to pay a fine corresponding to the number of cities not yet 
finished. The enforcement of the fine policy requires the public party to have at least as 
much information as the lump sum subsidy, as the public party needs to verify the 
completeness of the UFB project at date 24. Further on, we allow CFH to switch from a 
simple fine scheme to a two dimensional fine scheme. 
2) The simple fine component add-on in evaluation formula 
Under the simple fine scheme, the penalty only occurs at the date 24. Therefore, we only 
need to include the simple fine component to the evaluation formula at date 24 (which is the 
terminal condition). That is, 
{
       (    *       +)                                       
       (    *       +)                                    
 
{
       (    *       +)                                       
       (    *       +)                                    
 
{
       (    *       +)                                        
       (    *       +)                                    
 
{
       (    *       +)                                       
       (    *       +)                                    
 
Hence, the whole evaluation equation equals, 
 (    *       +)  
   (   *      +)
    
       
                     (       (    *       +)         (    *       +)
        (    *       +)         (    *       +)) (  )    
In equation 15,     is the total fine charged by the public party at date 24 (the simple fine 
component), while             is the penalty that Chorus pays for each unfinished city at 
date 24. 
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3) The two dimensional fine component add-on in evaluation formula 
In practice, we construct the two dimensional fine scheme by adding an extra group of 
targets at date 12 to the simple fine scheme. Therefore, we only need to show up the extra 
fine component. That is, 
{
       (     *       +)                                             
       (     *       +)                                      
       (     *       +)                                                            
 
Correspondingly the extra evaluation equation equals 
 (     *       +)
    { (     *       +)       (           )     
 
  (    ) (     *                   +)    (    ) (       *                   +)
  
} 
                            (     *       +) (  )    
In equation 16,     is the total amount of the extra fine, while             is the penalty that 
Chorus pays to CFH whenever it fails one target at date 12. For the evaluation of the two 
dimensional fine scheme, we need to combine both equation 15 and equation 16. 
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Chapter 6: The results 
6.1The measures of two sorts of conflicts 
Recall that there are two sorts of conflicts between Chorus and CFH in our model. A) The 
timing conflict indicates that Chorus and CFH may have different opinions about how many 
cities they would like to build up in each period. B) The sequencing conflict indicates these 
two parties may have different ideas about choosing the construction order among different 
cities. In this section, we are going to introduce appropriate measures for each sort of 
conflict in order to study them separately. 
A) The measure for timing conflict 
In this part, we introduce our measure for the timing conflicts, which is based on the 
expected number of total construction stages completed for certain fixed dates in the 
future.
57
 That is, for each given fixed date in the future (such as date 4), we first calculate the 
total number of construction stages expected to be finished when Chorus and CFH makes the 
decisions respectively, and then take the difference between them. If the difference turns out 
to be huge, it means that two parties have huge disagreement on how many construction 
stages should be finished during a certain time period  
In practice, we estimate the expected number of construction stages completed by using the 
law of iterated expectations. In this approach, at the “terminal” nodes58, the expected number 
of stages completed equals the actual number of completed stages corresponding to the state. 
For example, at node (0, 4), if the state *       +  equals *       +, the expected value equals 
       , which is  . However, for any previous (non-terminal) nodes, the expected 
number of stages that will be completed at the terminal node equals  
 (    *       +)
   (   ) (      *                   +)
   (   ) (        *                   +) 
                                                                                 (  )    
                                                          
57
 The fixed dates we choose are date 4 (the first year), date 8 (the second year), date 12 (the third year), date 
16 (the fourth year), date 20 (the fifth year) and date 24 (the last year). The above selected dates are arbitrary. 
58
 The terminal nodes here are the nodes only corresponding to the fixed dates. For example, if we take date 
4 as the fixed date, all nodes at date 4 will be the terminal nodes. 
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In this equation, (    *       +) is the expected value current node (   ).                      
 (      *                   +) is the expected value at next period when there has 
been one up move, while  (        *                   +) is the expected value next 
period when there has been one down move.    and    have been introduced here as the real 
probabilities of up and down moves occurring in the next period respectively, where   (   ) 
equals  
 
 
 
 √  
  
 and   (   ) equals  
 
 
 
 √  
  
 (See Guthrie (2009) for the corresponding derivation). 
We first calculate the expected value at all terminal points and then use the backward 
induction (using equation 15) to get the expected values at all previous periods. We report 
the expected number of construction stages completed for the conflict in the baseline case in 
which there are no incentive scheme at the panel B of table 6.1. 
B) The measure for sequencing conflict 
In this section, we introduce our measure for the sequencing conflict. The measure we apply 
to estimate the sequencing conflict is based on a table of conditional probabilities. In a 
probability table (panel C in table 6.1), there are two panels. The first one records 
probabilities related to Chorus‟s decisions, while the second one records probabilities related 
to CFH decisions. For each panel, the rows represent four different cities (HL, HH, LL and 
LH), while the columns represent the states of completion for each given city. More 
specifically, the first column denotes the city has been finished, whereas the following four 
columns denote all possible orders of completion for this city (First, Second, Third, Fourth). 
Therefore, each cell in the first column represents the probability that a corresponding city 
(rows) will be finished eventually, while each cell in the following four columns represents 
the conditional probability that a corresponding city (rows) will be finished in a 
corresponding order (columns) providing this city will be finished eventually.  
In practice, we need to calculate the unconditional probabilities that a city will be finished in 
a particular order before we can estimate the conditional probabilities (column 2 to column 5) 
and the probability for completion (the first column). In much the same way as calculating 
the expected number of construction stages completed, we apply the law of iterated 
expectations to estimate all unconditional probabilities. That is, we design a bundle of 
lotteries that have payoff equal to 1 whenever a corresponding city has just been finished in 
a particular order and payoff equal to zero when it is finished in a different order or not 
finished at all. In order to make the present values of lotteries equal the values of 
corresponding unconditional probabilities, we set the discount rate to zero. At the terminal 
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condition
59
, the payoffs of all lotteries equal 0 since none of the parties are allowed to have 
construction action when the contract expires. However, for any non-terminal nodes, the 
value of the lottery equals 
   (    *       +)
 {
                                                    (   )                                                                                                              
  (   )   (      *                   +)    (   )   (        *                   +)                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                  (  )    
In equation 16,    (    *       +) is the value of the lottery that city X has been finished in 
order Y at node (   ).     (      {                   }) is the value of the lottery 
next period when there has been one up move, while    (        {                 
 
 
}) is the value of the lottery next period when there has been one down move. After the 
terminal conditions and backward induction (using equation 16), we can get the expected 
value of lottery XY (   (    *       +)), which is the unconditional probability that city X 
has been finished in Y order. Then, we use equation 17 to get the probability of city X being 
finished eventually,  
           (    *       +)  ∑    (    *       +)
   
   
(  ) 
Therefore, the conditional probability that city X will be finished in Y order providing it will 
be finished eventually equals, 
              (    *       +)  
   (    *       +)
           (    *       +)
(  ) 
We provide an example of a probability table for the conflict in the baseline case in which 
there are no incentive scheme (which is at the panel C of table 6.1). 
6.2 The conflicts between two parties in the baseline case 
Before we start analysing incentive schemes, we discuss the profile of the conflicts between 
Chorus and CFH in the baseline case in which there is no incentive scheme. To get the 
profile of the conflicts, we follow several procedures. First, we apply the valuation processes 
that we develop at section 5.3 to estimate the present value of total surplus of the UFB 
project for Chorus under Chorus‟s optimal policy ( (    *       +)), the present value of 
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 We only take the nodes at date 24 as terminal condition. 
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“producer” surplus of the UFB project for CFH under CFH‟s optimal policy 
( (    *       +)) and the present value of the UFB project for CFH under Chorus‟s optimal 
policy ( (    *       +)). Then, we input  (    *       +) and  (    *       +) into equation 
11 to calculate the present value of conflict and equation 12 to calculate the proportion of 
conflict. 
Table 6.1: The profile of the conflicts in the baseline case  
Panel A : The prime outputs 
  (    *       +)  (    *       +)  (    *       +) PV conflict Proportion of conflict 
15.81 56.16 45.34 10.82 0.19 
The present value of total surplus for construction of only a single city  
 HL HH LL LH 
Chorus ‘policy 40.65 3.23 1.46 0 
CFH’s policy 40.65 13.5 2.02 0 
Panel B: The measure of timing conflict (the expected number of construction stage completed) 
 4 periods 8 periods 12 periods 16 periods 20 periods 24 periods 
Chorus 2.00 2.03 2.44 2.84 3.50 4.17 
CFH 2.23 3.42 4.44 4.99 5.41 5.82 
Panel C: The measure of sequencing conflict (the probability table) 
 Prob Completed                     Prob [built      built] 
  First Second Third Fourth 
Chorus  
HL 1 1 0 0 0 
HH 0.37 0 0 1 0 
LL 0.71 0 1 0 0 
LH 0 0 0 0 1 
Prob [             Chorus] 0 
CFH  
HL 1 1 0 0 0 
HH 0.97 0 1 0 0 
LL 0.91 0 0 1 0 
LH 0.04 0 0 0 1 
Prob [            CFH] 1 
 
We estimate the net present value of each single city under both CFH‟s and Chorus‟s 
policies in order to identify which city contributes the most to the level of total conflict. 
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After that, we use both the timing conflict and sequencing conflict measures to summarize 
the corresponding sequencing and timing conflicts. All parameters we apply in the above 
procedures are from table 5.1. We report the outputs in table 6.1. 
From panel A of table 6.1, we can learn that the present value of the UFB project for CFH 
when Chorus‟s optimal policies have been adopted equals 45.34, while the present value of 
the UFB project for CFH when CFH‟s optimal policies have been adopted equals 56.16. The 
difference between these two present values equals 10.82, which is the present value of 
conflict. We may interpret it as the present value of potential social welfare loss resulting 
from the disagreement between the two parties on optimal policies.
60
 This is because, 
assuming that CFH works in the best interests of society, its optimal policy should always 
maximise social welfare. Therefore, any policy which deviates from CFH‟s optimal policy 
may bring a potential social welfare loss, where these welfare losses may be raised either 
from an undersupply in the UFB network during certain periods
61
 or an incorrect priority 
policy among different cities.
62
 The conflicts between two parties have created 19.3 per cent 
of social welfare loss. When we compare the present value of total surplus for constructing a 
single city, we find that the conflicts in the baseline case (in which there are no incentive 
scheme) are mainly attributed to the disagreement between two parties on city HH.
63
 
Panel B reports the expected number of construction stages completed for both parties 
during given periods. In four periods, CFH expects to finish about 2.23 construction stages, 
while Chorus only expects to finish 2.00 construction stages. When we extend the periods 
from four to sixteen, the numbers of construction stages CFH would like to finish jumps to 
about 5, while the number for Chorus increases to about 2.84. Further, when we extend the 
periods to 24, the number for CFH jumps to about 5.8, while the number for Chorus 
increases to around 4.2. Clearly, there are disagreements on construction timing between two 
parties, that is, CFH is more aggressive than Chorus in building up the UFB network. The 
logic behind this result is quite clear when we recall the differences of the two parties‟ 
objective functions. As we know, for each completed city, CFH always receives consumer 
surplus plus producer surplus, while Chorus only receives producer surplus. The extra 
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 The difference is a consequence of the two parties’ disagreement on optimal policies. 
61
 The firm may work too slowly to provide enough supply to meet the social demand. 
62
 For saving the cost, the firm may give priority to a low cost city instead of a high cost city, even though the 
high cost city may have a higher total surplus than that of the low cost city. 
63
 About 94% of the baseline conflicts result from city HH. 
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surplus flow makes construction more profitable to CFH than Chorus. Therefore CFH 
always wants to build up more cities. 
In panel C, a comparison of conditional probabilities between Chorus and CFH illustrates 
their sequencing conflicts. Both parties agree that city HL should be the first city to be 
completed. However, after city HL has been completed, CFH and Chorus disagree on which 
city should go next, that is, CFH wants to build up city HH second providing that at least 
two cities (both city HL and city HH) are built up eventually (with conditional probability of 
1), while Chorus would like to build up city LL second instead providing that at least two 
cities (both city HL and city LL) are built up eventually (with conditional probability of 1 as 
well).
64
 Namely, a sequencing conflict arises between two parties when they are deciding 
which city should go second. Similarly, the two parties disagree on which city should go 
third. After finishing city HL and city HH, CFH certainly wants to finish city LL third (with 
conditional probability of 1) providing that at least three cities will be finished eventually. In 
contrast, Chorus wants to finish city HH third (with conditional probability of 1) providing 
that at least three cities will be finished eventually. For city LH, both parties consider it 
should be granted the lowest priority, which means that if city LH would be finished 
eventually it must go last. Table 6.2 is a summary for the construction behaviours and 
sequencing conflicts between CFH and Chorus. 
Table 6.2: Construction order for each party 
 The construction orders Sequencing Conflicts 
(Yes/No)  CFH Chorus 
If one city has been built up  HL HL No 
If two cities have been built up HLHH HLLL Yes 
If three cities have been built up HLHHLL HLLLHH Yes 
If four cities have been built up HLHHLLLH HLLLHHLH Yes 
 
As a measure of sequencing conflict, the conditional probabilities could be applied to not 
only identify the conflict but also show the “scale” of conflict. However, we need to control 
for the timing conflicts when we interpret the “scale” of sequencing conflicts. For example, 
if there are two cities going to be finished for both parties (no timing conflict), the difference 
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 The conditional probabilities that CFH builds up city LL second providing that both city HL and city LL have 
been built up eventually and Chorus builds up city HH second providing that both city HL and city HH have 
been built up eventually are zero since those behaviours never occur. 
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between conditional probabilities that CFH builds up city HH second and Chorus builds up 
city HH second are 1,
65
 which means that Chorus and CFH will have 100 per cent chance to 
disagree on the order of city completion (which is the maximum scale of sequencing conflict 
in our model). On the other hand, if this difference is smaller, the sequencing conflict 
between these two parties is smaller. 
In common with the timing conflicts, the different preferences on building up the second city 
between CFH and Chorus are triggered by the consumer surplus cash flow. With this extra 
cash flow, the capital expenditure plays a smaller role in CFH‟s present value than that of 
Chorus, which renders CFH less cost focused than Chorus. (In other words, CFH is more 
demand focused than Chorus.) Therefore, after the most profitable city, HL, has been 
finished, CFH would like to give priority to a high demand city (city HH), while Chorus 
would like to give priority to a low cost city (city LL).  
6.3 The sensitivity analysis on the conflicts in the baseline case  
In this section we report the results of sensitivity analysis on the conflicts in the baseline 
case in which there is no incentive scheme. That is, we study how the present value of 
conflict is affected by varying several parameters (DR, CR, Con or ). We also apply the 
two measures of conflicts to interpret the results of our sensitivity analysis. 
6.3.1 The sensitivity analysis on Con  
Con is the constant multiplier between consumer surplus and the square of producer surplus. 
In contrast to the demand and cost multipliers, the present value of conflict monotonically 
increases with Con. We report how the conflict level varies with Con at graph 6.1. As we 
can see, the present value of conflict is almost a convex curve with Con at graph 6.1. 
The logic behind this result is straightforward. When we raise Con, for any given producer 
surplus flow, the consumer surplus flow increases. Since raising the consumer surplus flow 
reduces the proportion of producer surplus in the total surplus, CFH and Chorus share less 
similarity in their economic interests. Therefore, the conflict between these two parties 
became bigger.  
We justify our explanation about the raising conflict by employing the two conflict measures. 
As we can see from graph 6.2, the conditional probability that Chorus would like to 
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complete city HH second providing that at least two cities will be finished always equals 
zero, while the corresponding conditional probability for CFH monotonically increases with 
Con. Therefore, the scale of sequencing conflict (which is the difference between the 
conditional probability of CFH and the conditional probability of Chorus) is monotonic 
increasing with Con.  
Graph 6.1: The present value of conflict varies with Con 
 
Graph 6.2: The sequencing conflict measures varies with Con  
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Graph 6.3: The timing conflict measures varies with Con   
 
 At graph 6.3, we apply the timing conflict measure to two target dates in order to justify the 
movement of conflict level over Con. That is, we estimate both the expected numbers of 
construction stages completed in 4 periods and 24 periods. The expected number in 4 periods 
gives us information about the timing differences between CFH and Chorus of those highly 
profitable cities, while the expected number in 24 periods adds the timing information about 
those marginal cities.
66
 We find that, for whichever target date we consider, the difference of 
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 For both CFH and Chorus, the profitable cities tend to be finished at the early stage, while the marginal 
cities would not be finished unless the contract is near expiration. Therefore, the difference of the expected 
number based on the expiration date (at date 24) is not able to capture the timing differences for those highly 
profitable cities between CFH and Chorus (since the high profitable cities will be finished by both parties 
before contract expire anyway). In contrast, the difference of the expected number based on the early stage 
(like 4 periods) is able to record the timing differences for those highly profitable cities but has nothing to say 
about the timing differences for those marginal cities (since neither party will develop the marginal cities in 
the early stage). An extreme case for the profitable city is city HL. As we can see from graph 6.3, both parties 
would like to finish city HL in 4 periods no matter how Con changes (at graph 6.3, the expected numbers of 
construction stages completed in 4 periods are equal or bigger than 2 for both parties. This indicates either at 
least one city has been finished or at least two cities are under construction. Since both parties want to 
construct city HL first due to its profitability, and neither party wants to interrupt the construction of city HL in 
order to start the construction of another city (parties only receive revenues from the completed cities), we 
believe city HL will be finished in 4 periods). Therefore, although the expected numbers of city HL equal 2 for 
both 4 periods and 24 periods, the 4 periods measure provides us more information about city HL’s timing 
since it not only tells us whether city HL would be finished before the contract expires but also how fast city 
HL would be completed. In contrast, city LH will be an extreme case for the marginal city since it would not be 
started unless other three cities have been finished. The expected number in 4 periods tells us nothing about 
the timing of city LH since it is nearly impossible for any party to start city LH in 4 periods. However, the 
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the expected number of construction stages completed between CFH and Chorus is 
monotonic increasing with Con. Hence, the timing conflict between the two parties is 
increasing with Con. In summary, raising Con increases both the timing and sequencing 
conflicts between two parties, therefore resulting in a higher level of total conflict between 
two parties.        
6.3.2 The sensitivity analysis on volatility () 
At graph 6.4, we find that the present value of conflict exponentially increases with volatility. 
When we raise the level of volatility from 0.1 to 0.15, the present value of conflict goes up 
from 4.24 to 10.8. After reaching the middle point (=0.15), the conflict level starts to 
increase far more quickly. That is, the conflict level jumps from 10.8 to 69 when we increase 
the volatility level from 0.15 to 0.2.
67
        
 Graph 6.4: The present value of conflict varies with  
 
At graph 6.5, we find that the conditional probabilities that city HH will be completed 
second providing that at least two cities will be finished eventually for both parties are 
constant over . In other words, the sequencing conflict between two parties hardly changes 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
expected number in 24 periods at least tells us how many stages of city LH are expected to be finished before 
the contract expires. The profitability of city HH and city LL is between city HL and city LH. 
67
 Our model does not work properly when volatility is above a certain level. This is because the growth rate 
of consumer surplus flow is an increasing function of volatility in our setting. When the volatility goes above a 
certain level, we find the growth rate of consumer surplus is higher than the corresponding discount rate, so 
that the present value of consumer surplus is undefined. Therefore, we cap annual volatility at 0.2 in our 
study, which we believe it is a realistic level of volatility for the internet business. 
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when we vary the level of volatility. Hence, the movement of the conflict level must be 
mainly driven by these two parties‟ timing disagreements.      
Graph 6.5: The sequencing conflict measures varies with  
 
Graph 6.6: The timing conflict measures varies with  
 
At graph 6.6, we find that the timing conflict between Chorus and CFH grows over the level 
of volatility. More specifically, the differences of the expected number of construction stages 
completed in both 4 and 24 periods are increasing with . In summary, although the increase 
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of volatility does not change the sequencing conflict, it does aggravate the timing conflict 
therefore increasing the level of total conflict between two parties. Besides, the increase of 
conflict level may be partially attributed to the increase of construction option value. For 
example, when we increase  from 0.1 to 0.2, the present value average of total surplus on 
constructing city HH under two parties‟ policies increases from 2.3 to 66.5  (clearly, the 
option value increases with volatility).
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6.3.3 The sensitivity analysis on DR and CR 
We conduct the sensitivity analysis for both demand and cost multipliers (DR and CR) in 
this section since they share several similarities in their effects on the present value of 
conflict. Recall that DR is the demand multiplier that we apply to the revenue of a standard 
city to form the high demand city, while CR is the cost multiplier that we apply to the capital 
expenditure of a standard city to form the high cost city. We report how the present value of 
conflict varies with demand and cost multipliers at graph 6.7 and 6.8 respectively. Because 
of limited space, we only investigate several selective DR and CR.
69
 
Graph 6.7: The present value of conflict varies with DR 
                 
                                                          
68
 We take the arithmetic average of the present value of total surplus on constructing city HH under CFH and 
Chorus’s policies. The change of this average gives us a clue about how the magnitude of conflict changes 
over volatility. 
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 For both DR and CR, we start the sensitivity analysis from the baseline case, that is DR=3 and CR=2. And 
then, we investigate how the level of conflicts in the baseline case changes when we change DR or CR. 
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Graph 6.7 shows the relationship between conflict level and DR is non-monotonic, that is, 
the conflict level first increases and then decreases over DR. We observe the same non-
monotonic movement of conflict level when we vary the cost multiplier at graph 6.8.  
Graph 6.8: The present value of conflict varies with CR 
 
Now, we discuss the effects of both DR and CR on the conflict level by analysing timing and 
sequencing conflict measures. The corresponding information for these two conflict 
measures has been reported at graph 6.9, graph 6.10, graph 6.11 and graph 6.12. From graph 
6.9 and 6.10, we find that the sequencing conflicts only exist for certain ranges of DR or CR. 
For example, controlling for CR at graph 6.9, both parties agree to finish the city LL before 
city HH when the demand multiplier is smaller than 2.5 (the conditional probabilities of 
building city HH second are equal to zero for both parties at graph 6.9). However, when we 
range DR between 2.5 and 4, we identify a sequencing conflict which is raised by the 
discordant shifts of construction preference between two parties. That is, although both 
parties would like to shift their construction preferences over which city should be finished 
second from city LL to city HH, the preference of CFH changes faster than that of Chorus. 
Further on, if we make DR bigger than 4, the sequencing conflict disappears and both parties 
agree to finish the city HH before city LL.                    
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Graph 6.9: The sequencing conflict measure varies over DR 
 
In contrast, controlling for DR at graph 6.10, both parties agree to finish city HH before city 
LL when the cost multiplier is smaller than 1.6 (the conditional probabilities of building city 
HH second are equal to one for both parties at graph 6.10). As for the case of the demand 
multiplier, we find a sequencing conflict when the cost multiplier ranges between 1.6 and 2.4. 
Further on, when the cost multiplier goes over 2.4, the sequencing conflict vanishes and both 
parties agree to finish the city LL before city HH. For both DR and CR, since the sequencing 
conflict only shows up in a range of parameters, it cannot be the major factor to drive the 
conflict level.    
The intuition behind the shift of construction preference is clear. As we learnt from the 
previous setting, city HL always dominates the other three cities, while city LH is always 
dominated by the others. Therefore, Chorus and CFH always order city HL first and city LH 
last. The only potential disagreement between these two parties on ordering will be city HH 
and city LL. Providing that a constant cost multiplier holds, when we increase the demand 
multiplier alone, the rising revenues make city HH relatively more profitable than city LL. 
Therefore both parties start to shift their construction preferences from city LL to city HH. 
However, when the DR goes up, CFH reaches the margin that city HH will be preferred over 
city LL earlier than Chorus due to the extra consumer surplus, which explains why the 
preference of CFH shifts faster than that of Chorus at graph 6.9. 
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 Graph 6.10: The sequencing conflict measure varies over CR 
 
On the other hand, when we increase the cost multiplier alone, the rising capital expenditures 
make city HH relatively more expensive (less profitable) than city LL. Therefore both 
parties start to prefer city LL over city HH. Thanks to the extra consumer surplus, CFH 
reaches the margin that city LL will be preferred over city HH later than Chorus when CR 
increases, which explains why the preference of CFH shifts slower than that of Chorus at 
graph 6.10. 
At graph 6.11, we plot the timing conflict measure as a function of DR. Here, the expected 
number of stages completed in 4 periods gives us the idea about the timing differences of the 
highly profitable cities between CFH and Chorus (which are city HL and city HH (when DR 
is relatively high)), while the expected number of stages completed in 24 periods adds up the 
timing information about the marginal cities (which are city LL and city HH (when DR is 
relatively low)).
70
 When we raise DR, the increase in the demand ratio raises both the 
producer surplus and consumer surplus of the high demand cities (which are city HL and city 
HH) , which definitely makes the high demand cities more preferable to both parties. On the 
one hand, the increases of surplus flows from raising DR have no impact on the two parties‟ 
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 We group city HL and city HH (when DR is big) into the profitable cities, and city LL and city HH (when DR is 
small) into the marginal cities. For example, when DR equals 6, we find the present values of total surplus for 
both city HL and city HH are over 100, while the corresponding present value for city LL is only 2. In contrast, 
when we set DR equal to 1.5, the present value of total surplus for city HH is 0.25. 
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timing disagreement on city HL.
71
 On the other hand, the increases of surplus flows from 
raising DR either aggravate or reduce the two parties‟ timing disagreement on city HH.72 In 
summary, the increase of DR has an ambiguous effect on the timing conflict.  
Graph 6.11: The timing conflict measure varies with DR 
 
When we increase DR, city HH shifts from a marginal city to a profitable city. Therefore, in 
order to understand the movement of the timing conflict on city HH, we have to combine the 
expected numbers of stages completed in both 4 periods (which is a good timing measure for 
a profitable city) and 24 periods (which is a good timing measure for ta marginal city). At 
graph 6.11, when we raise DR from 1.5 to 3, we observe an increase of the timing conflict 
on city HH (see the increased difference of the expected number between two parties for 24 
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 Since city HL is so profitable (for all selective DR) that both parties want to build it up as fast as they can, 
there is no timing conflict between CFH and Chorus on city HL regardless. 
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 The effect is attributed to the extra consumer surplus flow of CFH. That is, compared to Chorus, the 
existence of extra consumer surplus means that CFH requires a relatively small DR in order to want to 
complete city HH. Therefore, if we raise DR when it is relatively small, CFH may start to finish city HH 
eventually, while Chorus considers city HH is still worthless, which we observe as an increase of timing conflict 
on city HH between two parties. On the other hand, if we raise DR when it is relatively large, it may start to 
improve Chorus’s timing of city HH but have no effect on CFH’s timing of city HH (Since CFH already decides to 
complete city HH as soon as possible). This is why we observe a reduction of timing disagreement on city HH 
between two parties. 
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periods).
73
 When DR is between 3 and 4.5, we find that the timing conflict on city HH 
increases over DR (see the increased difference in the expected number of stages completed 
in 4 periods). Since the timing conflict on city HH dominates the timing conflict (in the 
aggregated level), we expect the timing conflict increases if we raise DR when it is relatively 
small (DR   4.5). After reaching the maximum, the timing conflict on city HH starts to 
decrease over DR (see the decreased difference in the expected number of stages completed 
in 4 periods when 4.5   DR  7.5). Further on, when we raise DR over 7.5, both parties 
would like to finish city HH in 4 periods therefore the timing conflict on city HH 
disappears
74
 (the difference of the expected number for 4 periods is zero). The only timing 
conflict left is for city LL,
75
 which remains constant over DR (the difference of the expected 
number for 24 periods is constant when 7.5   DR). In summary, we expect the timing 
conflict decreases if we raise DR when it is relatively large (4.5   DR).          
Graph 6.12: The timing conflict measures varies with CR 
 
                                                          
73
 Although the construction of city HH is becoming more and more attractive to both parties when we raise 
DR, it is still not profitable enough to induce either player to finish it within 4 periods. Hence, the timing 
measure for 4 periods is not sensitive to the movement of DR. 
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 For both CFH and Chorus, it is the fastest speed they can have to build up city HH unless they can exercise 
the speed up option. However, it is unreasonable to do it at the first few nodes since the improvement of 
state is never high enough to justify the cost of exercising speed up option. 
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 Although the timing conflict on city LL exists when DR   7.5, it is dominated by the timing conflict on city 
HH. 
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Due to the increased capital expenditure, city HH will soon became a marginal city when we 
raise CR. Hence, the expected number of construction stages completed in 24 periods (which 
is a good timing measure for a marginal city) may provide us more information about the 
movement of timing conflict on city HH. Since the timing conflict on city HH dominates the 
aggregate timing conflict, the movement of timing conflict on city HH indicates the 
movement of aggregate timing conflict over CR.  
 
At graph 6.12, when we raise CR from 1.2 to 2.4, we find the difference on the expected 
number of construction stages completed in 24 periods between two parties increases from 
1.1 to 1.9. As soon as it reaches the peak, the timing conflict on city HH starts to decrease 
over CR (CR   2.4). When we compare graph 6.12 with graph 6.8, we find the movements 
of timing conflict on city HH and the present value of conflict (in the aggregate level) are 
quite similar (that is, the increased capital expenditure from raising CR has an ambiguous 
effect (non-monotonic) on both the timing conflict on city HH and the present value of the 
aggregate timing conflict
76
). The only difference we find is that they peak at different levels 
of CR. That is, the timing conflict measure on city HH peaks when CR equals 2.4, while the 
present value of aggregate timing conflict peaks when CR equals 2. However, this distortion 
results from the fact that the decrease in magnitude of the present value of total surplus on 
building up city HH (which is caused by the increase of CR) dominates the increase of 
timing conflict on city HH. That is, when we increase CR from 2 to 2.4, we find that the 
present value of total surplus from constructing city HH under the two parties‟ policies 
decreases from 8.4 to 3.6 (more than half), while the corresponding timing conflict only 
increases from 1.7 to 1.9. Recall that, the timing conflict on city HH is a good proxy for the 
aggregate timing conflict. Therefore, the above similarity shows us that the present value of 
conflict could be well explained by the timing conflict. 
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 Compared to Chorus, the existence of extra consumer surplus slows down CFH’s speed in abandoning city 
HH. Therefore, if we raise CR when it is relatively small, Chorus may change its construction preference on city 
HH faster than that of CFH, leading to an increase of timing conflict on city HH between two parties. On the 
other hand, if we raise CR when it is relatively large, it may still be able to change CFH’s timing of city HH but 
have no effect on Chorus’ timing of city HH (Since Chorus already abandons city HH completely), leading to a 
reduction of timing disagreement on city HH between the two parties. 
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Chapter 7: The optimal incentive tools 
In this section, we are going to study the efficiencies of several incentive vehicles in 
reducing the possible conflicts. More specifically, we not only investigate what will be the 
minimum conflict level for each incentive tool, but also how the incentive scheme reduces 
the relevant conflicts. Further on, we compare these incentive schemes in their abilities of 
reducing the possible conflicts. 
7.1 The study of subsidy schemes 
7.1.1 The optimal proportional subsidy  
Recall that the proportional subsidy is a monetary transfer from CFH to Chorus, which is 
proportional to Chorus‟ current capital expenditure level. The proportional subsidy scheme 
requires the public party being able to learn about Chorus‟s “actual” capital expenditure at 
each period. In order to identify the global minimum conflict level, we first vary the 
proportional subsidy with a small step (0.01 for per step), which causes the graph of the 
present value of conflict to become quite lumpy
77
. Therefore, to reconstruct a relatively 
smooth curve but guarantee the global minimum conflict level, we extract the turning point 
(the minimum) from the lumpy curve and plot it at graph 7.1. Starting from this turning point, 
we plot the conflict level corresponding to a bigger step increase in the proportional subsidy 
(0.05 for per step). That is, beginning from 0.41 subsidy rate, we plot the corresponding 
conflict level either when we decrease the subsidy rate by 0.05 on the left hand side or 
increase the subsidy rate by 0.05 on the right hand side. We report a relatively smooth curve 
for how the conflict level varies with the proportional subsidy at graph 7.1. 
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 The lumpiness of the curve is due to the binomial tree method. That is, a small change in the subsidy rate 
results in a small change in all the values of cash flows (In the binomial tree) and therefore a small change in 
Chorus’s construction behavior in reality. However, with the discrete method we apply, there can be a 
relatively large change in our binominal tree. For example, it may require Chorus to have 1.9 up moves to 
construct city HH in reality. After a small change to the subsidy rate, Chorus needs to have 2.1 up moves to 
build up city HH. As a result, in the discrete method, instead of constructing city HH with 2 up moves, Chorus 
then only exercises city HH with three up moves despite there being only a small change in the subsidy rate.  
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Graph 7.1: The present value of conflict varies with proportional subsidy 
 
Clearly, the conflict level first decreases and then increases with the proportional subsidy 
rate. The conflict between the two parties reaches the minimum level (0.72) when the 
subsidy rate equals 0.41. That is, at each period, the optimal monetary transfer from CFH to 
Chorus should equal 41 per cent of the private parties‟ capital expenditure in that period. The 
logic behind the non-monotonic change of the conflict level is quite straightforward. Chorus 
becomes more aggressive in the UFB network‟s construction when there is a reduction in the 
proportion of capital expenditure that Chorus needs to bear. Therefore, the decrease of the 
conflict level at first is due to reducing the difference between CFH and Chorus in their 
construction preferences.
78
 In contrast, in the second half of the graph, the further increase of 
the subsidy rate makes Chorus more aggressive than CFH in the UFB network‟s construction. 
Therefore the deviation of construction preferences between the two parties starts to increase. 
Consequently, we observe an increase of the conflict level with the subsidy rate in the 
second half of the graph.  
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 When there is no subsidy, Chorus is less aggressive than CFH in the UFB network’s construction. The add-on 
of a subsidy increases Chorus’s aggression in construction therefore resulting in a better match between the 
two parties’ construction preferences.  
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Graph 7.2: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’s optimal 
policy) vary with proportional subsidy 
 
The present value to CFH of constructing an individual city (under Chorus‟ optimal policy) 
may further support the non-monotonic change of conflict level, and most important, explain 
why its minimum lies at the 0.41 subsidy rate. Graph 7.2 plots the present values to CFH of 
the individual cities.
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 At graph 7.2, the present value of city HH increases with the 
proportional subsidy and peaks at a subsidy rate of about 0.45, while the present value of 
city LL has its peak at a subsidy rate of 0.2 and then slowly decreases with the proportional 
subsidy. The minimum conflict level, of course, balances the marginal increase of the 
present value of city HH and the marginal decrease of the present value of city LL. That is, 
the marginal increase of PV HH dominates the marginal effects of PV LL  and PV LH when 
the subsidy rate is smaller than 0.41, while the corresponding increase of PV HH is in turn 
dominated by the decrease of PV LL when the subsidy rate ranges from 0.41 to 0.45. 
Therefore, the minimum conflict level occurs at a subsidy rate of  0.41. Besides, the sharp 
diving of PV LL explains why the conflict level rockets up after the proportional subsidy 
rate goes over 0.7 (The present value of LH starts to dominate the conflict level when the 
proportional subsidy rate reaches 0.7). To see why this happens, recall that the objective 
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 We do not plot the city HL due to two reasons. 1) The present value of city HL is so high that it would distort 
the graph (compared with the other three cities). 2) The present value of city HL remains independent of the 
subsidy rate since the subsidy schemes have no impact on Chorus’ construction behaviors on city HL (City HL 
is so profitable that Chorus will construct it as fast as CFH).  
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function of CFH is to maximize the difference between the present value of the sum of 
producer surplus and consumer surplus and the capital expenditure, while the objective 
function of Chorus is to maximize the difference between the present value of the sum of 
producer surplus and subsidy and the capital expenditure. If the value of the subsidy is far 
bigger than the consumer surplus of city LH, Chorus may still build up city LH very fast to 
get the subsidy when the state of demand is not favourable. However, CFH may choose to 
abandon the construction of city LH when the state of demand is not favourable, since the 
corresponding consumer surplus is not sufficient to justify the related construction costs. 
That is, when the proportional subsidy is high, Chorus would be over-subsidized to construct 
city LH very fast, which deviates from CFH‟s optimal policy. Therefore, the present value to 
CFH of city LH drops dramatically when the subsidy rate is high. 
Now, we incorporate both timing conflict and sequencing conflict measures into our 
discussion. We focus more on the timing conflict measure rather than the sequencing 
conflict measure since the present value of conflict is mainly attributed to the two parties‟ 
differences in construction timing. 
Graph 7.3: The timing conflict measures vary over proportional subsidy 
 
For the timing conflict measure, we provide the expected numbers of construction stages 
completed in both 4 and 24 periods at graph 7.3. Unsurprisingly, the expected numbers of 
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construction stages completed for CFH remain constant over the proportional subsidy
80
 
(which is the red line and the green line at graph 7.3). For Chorus, the expected numbers of 
construction stages completed are smaller than that of CFH when there is a small 
subsidy.(This is consistent with the fact that Chorus is less aggressive than CFH in the 
network‟s construction when there is no subsidy) However, when we start to increase the 
proportional subsidy, we find that the expected numbers of construction stages completed for 
Chorus are increasing (which is the yellow line and the blue line at graph 7.3). That is, the 
proportional subsidy scheme generally accelerates Chorus‟ timing in network‟s 
construction.
81
   
We find that the timing conflict in 4 periods (which is the difference in the expected number 
of construction stages completed in 4 periods at graph 7.3) follows a similar non-monotonic 
change as the present value of city LL, while the timing conflict in 24 periods (which is the 
difference in the expected number of construction stages completed in 24 periods at graph 
7.3) follows a similar non-monotonic change as the present value of city HH.
82
 In other 
words, the graph 7.3 supports the interpretation of graph 7.1. 
As we observe from graph 7.4, the conditional probability that CFH wants to complete city 
HH second providing that at least two cities will be finished always equals 1 (Since the 
subsidy does not affect CFH‟s construction behaviour), while the corresponding conditional 
probability for Chorus monotonically increases over the proportional subsidy. Therefore, the 
scale of the sequencing conflict is monotonic decreasing over the proportional subsidy, and 
entirely disappears when the proportion of subsidy goes over 56 per cent. Namely, both 
parties agree to finish the city HH before city LL after the proportional subsidy rate reaches 
the certain level.
83
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 Recall that CFH’s construction behaviors are not affected by the subsidy scheme. 
81
 It is intuitive that the less capital expenditure Chorus needs to bear the faster it wants to build up the UFB 
network. 
82
 PV LL and the timing conflict measure in 4 periods peak at about 0.2 subsidy rate, while PV HH and the 
timing conflict measure in 24 periods peak at around 0.4. Recall that the timing conflict measure in 4 periods 
is a good proxy for the profitable city‘s timing (which is city LL for Chorus), while the timing conflict measure 
in 24 periods is a good proxy for the marginal city’s timing (which is city HH for Chorus). 
83
 The logic behind Chorus’ shift of construction preference is clear. When there is no subsidy, Chorus may 
prefer city LL over city HH. However, for any one per cent increase in the proportional subsidy, city HH 
receives more compensation in dollar term than city LL. As a result, when we keep increasing the subsidy rate, 
the relative profitability of city LL to city HH will decrease over time. Therefore, Chorus may start to prefer city 
HH when the subsidy rate reaches the certain level. 
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Graph 7.4: The sequencing conflict measures vary over proportional subsidy  
 
7.1.2 The optimal fixed subsidy  
Like the proportional subsidy in the previous section, the fixed subsidy is a monetary 
transfer from CFH to Chorus. However, instead of being proportional to Chorus‟s current 
capital expenditure level, the fixed subsidy scheme requires CFH to make a fixed payment to 
Chorus for undertaking each construction stage in a period. Namely, the fixed subsidy 
scheme requires the public party being able to learn about how many construction stages in 
total Chorus are undertaking each period but not whether construction is high or low cost. 
We report how the conflict level varies with the level of the fixed subsidy at graph 7.5. 
As for the proportional subsidy scheme, the conflict level first decreases and then increases 
with the level of fixed subsidy. Nevertheless, the minimum conflict level resulting from the 
fixed subsidy scheme equals 0.95, which is higher than the minimum conflict level (0.72) 
resulting from the proportional subsidy scheme. The corresponding optimal fixed subsidy 
level equals 8.95.  
The reason behind the non-monotonic change of conflict level over the fixed subsidy is 
exactly the same as what we find from the proportional subsidy scheme. One strong support 
for this argument is that, for both proportional and fixed subsidy schemes, Chorus‟s expected 
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numbers of construction stages completed (the measure of construction timing) are 
increasing with subsidies.
84
 
Graph 7.5: The present value of conflict varies with fixed subsidy 
 
Similarly, we apply the present values to CFH of individual cities (under Chorus‟ optimal 
policy) to understand the minimum level of conflict under the fixed subsidy. At graph 7.6, 
the present value of city HH grows over the fixed subsidy and has a peak when the fixed 
subsidy sits about 8.9. On the other hand, the present value of city LL reaches the maximum 
when the subsidy level equals 1. After dropping down from the peak, the present value of 
city LL remains constant for high levels of the fixed subsidy. Since the movement of PV HH 
dominates when the fixed subsidy is not too high, the minimum conflict level, of course, 
should be a project of PV HH. Therefore, the minimum conflict level occurs at a subsidy 
level of 8.9. As for the proportional subsidy, the huge jump of conflict level is attributed to 
over-investment in city LH when the level of the fixed subsidy is very high.
85
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 This implies that Chorus is becoming more and more aggressive in the UFB network’s construction when we 
increase the level of fixed subsidy. 
85
 As for the proportional subsidy, the high level of fixed subsidy encourages Chorus to build up city LH very 
quickly, which is not the optimal behavior to CFH. Therefore, the PV LH drops dramatically when the subsidy 
rate is high. 
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Graph 7.6: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’ optimal 
policy) vary with fixed subsidy 
 
For the fixed subsidy, we find the corresponding timing measures share the same features as 
that of the proportional subsidy. That is, A) the fixed subsidy scheme generally accelerates 
Chorus‟s timing in the network‟s construction; B) the timing conflict measures follow the 
same non-monotonic paths as the present values of city HH and city LL.
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We find the scale of the sequencing conflict decreases over the level of fixed subsidy, which 
is similar to that under the proportional subsidy scheme. However, the fixed subsidy scheme 
never makes the sequencing conflict disappear entirely (the conditional probability that 
Chorus wants to complete city HH second providing that at least two cities will be finished 
never reaches 1). 
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 The slight mismatch between the timing conflict in 24 periods and PV HH may result from the fact that, 
although the timing conflict in 24 periods is a good proxy for the timing of city HH, it is distorted by the timing 
of city LL (as an aggregate timing measure). As we can see, Chorus becomes more aggressive than CFH in 
building up city LL when the subsidy level is low.  
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Graph 7.7: The timing conflict measures vary over the fixed subsidy 
 
Graph 7.8: The sequencing conflict measures vary over fixed subsidy 
 
7.1.3 The optimal lump sum subsidy  
In contrast to the fixed subsidy (in which CFH arranges a fixed payment to Chorus for 
undertaking each construction stage during this period), under the scheme considered here 
CFH only makes a lump sum payment to Chorus corresponding to the number of cities that 
have been completed during a period. That is, the lump sum subsidy scheme requires CFH to 
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learn about how many construction stages in total have been completed by Chorus during 
each period. Depending on whether the high demand cities could be identified by CFH,
87
 we 
included two kinds of lump sum subsidy schemes in our model. 
1. The lump sum subsidy scheme not corresponding to the features of cities 
In this section, we would like to discuss the lump sum subsidy scheme which is independent 
of the demand state of each city. That is, the lump sum payment for each completed city is 
identical. To avoid confusion, the lump sum subsidy in this section is referred to as the 
“independent lump sum subsidy”, while the lump sum subsidy in the next section is referred 
to as the “demand dependent lump sum subsidy”. We report how the conflict level varies 
with the level of the independent lump sum subsidy at graph 7.9. 
Graph 7.9: The present value of conflict varies with the independent lump sum subsidy  
 
For the independent lump sum subsidy, we find that the corresponding change of conflict 
level not only shares the same path as that of the fixed subsidy but also has the same 
minimum level at 0.95. However, the corresponding optimal level for the lump sum subsidy 
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 When CFH could identify the high capital expenditure cities, it could directly navigate from the lump sum 
subsidy scheme to the proportional subsidy scheme. Therefore, we are interested in the case that demand 
information about cities could be collected. 
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equals 18 rather than 8.95.
88
 Similarly, we find the reason behind the non-monotonic change 
of conflict level over the independent lump sum subsidy is exactly the same as what we find 
from the previous two subsidy schemes. Of course, we observe that Chorus‟s expected 
numbers of construction stages completed (the timing measure) is increasing with the lump 
sum subsidy as well.  
For the independent lump sum subsidy scheme, we rationalize the minimum level of conflict 
with the present values to CFH of individual cities (under Chorus‟ optimal policy). At graph 
7.10, we find that PV LL and PV LH follow the same movements as those under the fixed 
subsidy, and that they are dominated by the PV HH. Similarly, the minimum conflict level 
should be determined by PV HH, which has a peak when the level of the independent lump 
sum subsidy equals 18. Therefore, the minimum conflict level occurs at a subsidy level of 18.  
Graph 7.10: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’ optimal 
policy) vary with the independent lump sum subsidy 
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 This results from the difference of payment timing between fixed and lump sum subsidy schemes. For 
example, for any specified city, if Chorus would like to start the first construction stage at date 0 and then the 
second construction stage at date 1, the fixed subsidy scheme requires CFH making a fixed amount of 
payment FS at date 0 and date 1 respectively, while the lump sum subsidy scheme only requires CFH 
arranging one lump sum payment LS at date 2. Therefore, in order to have equivalent present values, the 
fixed subsidy and lump sum subsidy should meet the condition that    
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Graph 7.11: The timing conflict measures vary over the independent lump sum subsidy  
 
Graph 7.12: The sequencing conflict measures vary over the independent lump sum 
subsidy  
 
Except for the intersections, we find the timing measures under the independent lump sum 
subsidy scheme (at graph 7.11) follow the exact same paths as those under the fixed subsidy 
scheme, which implies that Chorus may have the same construction timing under both the 
independent lump sum subsidy and fixed subsidy schemes (Clearly, the only difference we 
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identify from comparing graph 7.7 and graph 7.11 is that, the corresponding intersections lie 
on the different subsidy level, which may consistent to the condition    
  
  
 
  
   
).  
At graph 7.12, we find the sequencing conflict under the independent lump sum subsidy 
scheme follows a similar path to that under the fixed subsidy scheme, meaning that the 
sequencing conflict decreases over the level of subsidy. The only difference we observe is 
that the sequencing conflict under the fixed subsidy scheme starts to decrease when the 
subsidy level equals about 10, while the sequencing conflict under the lump sum subsidy 
starts to decrease when the subsidy level equals about 20. 
2. The lump sum subsidy scheme corresponding to the demand information  
In contrast, the lump sum subsidy scheme in this section generates cash flows that depend on 
the demand state of each city. That is, the lump sum payment Chorus receives from a high 
demand city may be different from what it receives from a low demand city. Therefore, we 
use the label     for the lump sum subsidy to the high demand city, and     for the lump 
sum subsidy to the low demand city. Accordingly, we have a 3D rather than 2D plot for how 
the conflict level varies with the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme at graph 7.13. 
Graph 7.13: The conflict level varies with the demand relevant lump sum subsidy 
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At graph 7.13, we find the conflict level is a non-monotonic function of both     and    . 
However, compared to    , the conflict level is more sensitive to the change of    , which 
implies that the lump sum subsidy to high demand cities plays a more important role than the 
lump sum subsidy to low demand cities in reducing the conflict level. (This may be 
consistent with the fact that city HH is the main driver of the conflicts in the baseline case in 
which there are no incentive scheme.) The minimum conflict level for the demand relevant 
lump sum subsidy scheme equals 0.07, which corresponds to        and      . 
Obviously, the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme works better than all the above 
subsidy schemes (the proportional, fixed and independent lump sum subsidies). 
Graph 7.14: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’ optimal 
policy) vary with the demand relevant lump sum subsidy 
  
  
 
Graph 7.14 plots the present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus‟ optimal 
policy). As we can see from graph 7.14, although city HL has the highest present value, it is 
hardly affected by the demand relevant subsidy. (The present value to CFH of city HL is a 
smooth plane at graph 7.14.) The present value of city HH, however, is a non-monotonic 
function of     but almost independent of    . In contrast, the present value of city LL is 
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barely affected by     but a non-monotonic function of    . This observation does explain 
why     plays a more important role than     in reducing the conflict level. Recall that the 
present value of conflict is driven mainly by the present value of city HH. Therefore, the 
conflict level should be led by the subsidy that determines the present value of city HH, 
which is    . As for the above three subsidy schemes, the present value of city LH is a 
decreasing function of     when     reaches a certain level. The decreasing present value 
of city LH is caused by Chorus‟ overinvestment behavior under the high subsidy.89 
For the timing conflict measure, we provide the expected numbers of construction stages 
completed in both 4 and 24 periods at graph 7.15. Instead of having the 3D graph, we plot 
how the timing conflict measures vary over     for each given level of    . (We plot the 
graphs for      ,      ,        and       ) Similar to the above three subsidy 
schemes, Chorus becomes more and more aggressive in the network‟s construction when we 
increase the demand relevant subsidy. More specifically, for each given level of    , the 
expected numbers of construction stages completed for Chorus (both in 4 and 24 periods) are 
increasing with    . For each given level of    , the expected numbers of construction 
stages completed for Chorus (both in 4 and 24 periods) are increasing with    . When we 
set     equal to 0 or 2 (the first two panels in graph 7.15), the expected numbers for Chorus 
in 4 periods reflect how the construction timing of city HH increases when     is relatively 
big, while the expected numbers for Chorus in 24 periods reflect how the construction timing 
of city HH increases when     is relatively small.90 Nevertheless, if we shift     to 10 or 30 
(The last two panels in graph 7.15), only the expected numbers for Chorus in 24 periods 
reflect how the construction timing of city HH increases with    . On the other hand, 
keeping     fixed, we find that the increase of     is going to level up the expected 
numbers for Chorus in 24 periods without changing its trend. 
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 This shares the same argument as that in the footnote 86. 
90
 City HL is barely affected by any subsidy. Therefore, the lump sum subsidy for high demand cities mainly 
affects city HH’s construction timing. When the subsidy to high demand cities is relatively low, the 
construction of city HH is marginal to Chorus. In contrast, when the subsidy to high demand cities is relatively 
high, the construction of city HH becomes very profitable to Chorus. Since the expected numbers in 4 periods 
are sensitive to the profitable city, while the expected numbers in 24 periods are sensitive to the marginal city. 
The expected numbers in 4 periods should correspond to the city HH under the high subsidy, while the 
expected numbers in 24 periods should correspond to the city HH under the low subsidy. 
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Graph 7.15: The timing conflict measures vary over the demand relevant lump sum 
subsidy  
A) 
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Graph 7.16: The sequencing conflict measures vary over the demand relevant lump 
sum subsidy  
 
Graph 7.16 plots the conditional probability that Chorus wants to complete city HH second 
providing that at least two cities will be finished.
91
 When there is not any subsidy (both     
and     equal 0), the conditional probability for Chorus equals 0. If we keep     constant, 
the corresponding conditional probability for Chorus monotonically increases over    . If 
we keep     constant instead (when     is bigger than 8), the corresponding conditional 
probability for Chorus, however, monotonically decreases over    . The logic behind this is 
clear. That is, for any given level of    , the increase of     encourages Chorus to construct 
city HH more aggressively (the construction timing of city HH increases), which indicates 
the city HH has a higher chance of being finished earlier than the city LL. In contrast, for 
any given level of     (when     is bigger than 8), the increase of     encourages Chorus 
to construct city LL more aggressively (the construction timing of city LL increases), which 
indicates that city LL has more chance of being finished earlier than city HH.
 92 
Besides, we 
may realize that, the larger     is, the more     is required to make the conditional 
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 Since the subsidy does not affect CFH’s construction behaviours, the conditional probability that CFH wants 
to complete city HH second providing that at least two cities will be finished always equals 1, which is a 
smooth plane. Therefore, we only plot the conditional probability for Chorus. 
92
 When LS1 is smaller than 8, the corresponding conditional probability for Chorus is close to zero, which 
cannot be reduced further when LS2 increases. (Since the increase of LS2 speeds up the construction timing 
of city LL, it only reduces the conditional probability when it is big) 
0
10
20
30
LS1
0
10
20
30
LS2
0.0
0.5
1.0
the conditional probability of building HH at second
97 
 
probability to be 1. This is because, with a larger    , Chorus tends to construct city LL 
faster, which makes it harder to be overtaken by city HH in construction timing. Therefore, 
the corresponding     (the subsidy component that makes the city HH overtake city LL in 
construction timing) is required to be larger. In summary, the sequencing conflict is more 
likely to disappear when the lump sum subsidy for the high demand cities (   ) is high but 
the lump sum subsidy for the low demand cities (   ) is low. 
7.2 The sensitivity analysis of the incentive schemes 
For each incentive scheme, the sensitivity analysis of the profile of the optimal subsidy may 
help us have a better understanding about how the level of optimal subsidy (correspondingly 
the level of minimum conflict) is affected by varying several parameters (Con, DR , CR 
and ). Therefore, we could have some comments about the stability of the optimal subsidy 
under the different subsidy schemes. However, we only provide the sensitivity analysis for 
the proportional subsidy and independent lump sum subsidy schemes.
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1) The sensitivity analysis of the proportional subsidy scheme 
Graph 7.17 plots the results of the sensitivity analysis on several important parameters (Such 
as Con, DR , CR and ) under the proportional subsidy scheme. That is, the conflict level at 
graph 7.17 is not only a function of the proportional subsidy rate but also a function of one 
of these parameters. For the particular level of each parameter, the optimal subsidy rate is the 
subsidy rate corresponding to the minimum conflict level on that curve. And then, as we 
vary the parameter, we can track out how sensitive the optimal subsidy rate is to this 
parameter. At the top left corner of graph 7.17, we find the conflict level is insensitive to the 
subsidy rate when Con is small, which means the optimized conflict level is indifferent from 
those non-optimized conflict levels. However, when Con is getting bigger, the conflict level 
under each given subsidy rate is becoming higher, more importantly, the less the given 
subsidy rate is the more the corresponding conflict level increases, which indicates that the 
conflict level becomes more sensitive to the subsidy rate. The logic behind the increase of 
Con is quite straightforward. When we raise Con, the corresponding consumer surplus is 
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 In order to conduct the sensitivity analysis for the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme, we need to 
plot a 4D graph, which is too complicated for our current research. Besides, the results of sensitivity analysis 
from the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme are quantitatively similar to that in other subsidy 
schemes. For the fixed subsidy scheme, it looks almost identical to the independent lump sum subsidy 
scheme except for the higher monitoring costs. Therefore, we skip the above two subsidy schemes in our 
sensitivity analysis. 
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increasing according to equation 1. Consequently, the conflict level between CFH and 
Chorus is getting bigger since the consumer surplus is the main source of conflicts. At the 
bottom left corner of graph 7.17, we provide the result of the sensitivity analysis for the cost 
ratio (CR). That is, when CR is quite high (Such as CR=6), the conflict level is quite low and 
optimized at a subsidy rate of about 0.2. As the cost ratio falls to 4 or 5, there is little change 
in the conflict level and the optimal subsidy rate still lies on about 0.2. However, once the 
cost ratio reaches about 2 or 3, we observe two changes. First, the optimal subsidy rate is 
increasing (which is about 0.4 subsidy rate). Second, the level of conflict is increasing. 
Namely, even with a subsidy rate of 0.2 (which is the optimal subsidy rate when CR is 
bigger), the conflict is relatively substantial when the cost ratio becomes quite low. When 
that happens, the optimal subsidy rate needs to be higher. The reason behind this is clear. 
When the cost ratio is relatively high,
94
 both CFH and Chorus found the construction of city 
HH is so unprofitable that the disagreements
95
 between these two cities on constructing city 
HH disappear.  
At graph 7.17, we post the result of sensitivity analysis on the demand ratio (DR) at the top 
right corner. When DR is extremely high (When DR ranges between 8 and 11), the conflict 
level is quite low and the corresponding optimal subsidy rate lies on about 0.25. However, 
once the demand ratio reduces to about 3 or 4, we find both the conflict level and optimal 
subsidy rate become larger.
96
 The reason behind the lumpiness of the graph is quite similar 
to that of the cost ratio. When the demand ratio is very high (When DR ranges between 8 
and 11), both parties consider the construction of city HH is so profitable that both of them 
would like to build it very quickly. In contrast, when the demand ratio becomes very small 
(that is, close to DR=1), both parties consider the construction of city HH is so unprofitable 
that neither of them would like to build the city HH up. Therefore, the disagreements 
between CFH and Chorus on constructing city HH vanish either when the demand ratio is 
very large or very small, leaving the lumpiness between these two extremes.  
At the bottom right corner of graph 7.17, we show the result of sensitivity analysis of the 
level of volatility (). That is, if we increase the level of volatility, the conflict level under a 
high subsidy rate increases, while the conflict level under a low subsidy rate decreases.
97
 As 
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 What we mean is that the cost ratio is higher than the demand ratio. 
95
 The disagreement is for both the sequencing and timing conflicts. 
96
 The optimal subsidy rate shifts from about 0.25 to about 0.45. 
97
 As we can see, the conflict level under the 0.8 subsidy rate decreases over the volatility, while the conflict 
level under the 0.2 subsidy rate increases over the volatility. 
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a result, the optimal subsidy rate increases from 0.4 to 0.65 when we increase  from 0.1 to 
0.2. In contrast, the corresponding minimum conflict level reduces slightly. In summary, 
under the proportional subsidy scheme, the conflict level becomes more sensitive to the 
subsidy rate in two cases. A) When either DR or CR turns out to be modest; B) When either 
Con or  turns out to be large. However, in practice, the CFH may hope the conflict level is 
insensitive to the subsidy rate (In other words, CFH may hope that they are not in case A or 
case B). This is because the more insensitive the subsidy is the harder it is for CFH to have a 
bad incentive plan to manage the conflict.
98
 
Graph 7.17: The sensitivity analysis of several interesting parameters under the 
proportional subsidy scheme. 
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 For example, when the level of volatility equals 0.2, the conflict level is quite sensitive to the subsidy rate. 
Therefore, CFH is going to be concerned by the very high level of conflict that occurs they get the subsidy rate 
slightly wrong. In contrast, when the level of volatility equals 0.1, they are less worried about that since the 
level of conflict cannot go too high even when the subsidy rate differs significantly from its optimal value. 
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2) The sensitivity analysis of the independent lump sum subsidy scheme 
Graph 7.18 plots the results of the sensitivity analysis on several important parameters (Con, 
DR , CR and ) under the independent lump sum subsidy scheme. Similarly, we report the 
results of sensitivity analysis to Con, DR , CR and  at the top left corner of graph 7.18, the 
top right corner of graph 7.18, the bottom left corner of graph 7.18 and the bottom right 
corner of graph 7.18 respectively. The results of the sensitivity analysis to Con, DR, CR and 
 under the independent lump sum subsidy scheme are quite similar to those under the 
proportional subsidy scheme.
99
 The only difference we observe is that the corresponding 
optimal subsidy values are different between these two subsidy schemes. 
Graph 7.18: The sensitivity analysis of several interesting parameters under the 
independent lump sum subsidy scheme. 
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 The readers may find the results from the proportional subsidy scheme are smoother than those from the 
independent lump sum subsidy scheme. We believe this occurs because we plot more values of the 
independent lump sum subsidy than the proportional subsidy in our sensitivity analysis. 
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7.3 The comparison of subsidy schemes 
In this section, we compare the above four subsidy schemes‟ ability to reduce the possible 
conflicts. More importantly, we are going to discuss their differences in monitoring costs and 
information requirements.  
Clearly, the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme has the best performance in 
achieving the minimum conflict level among all subsidy schemes. The proportional subsidy 
scheme, however, works less efficiently than the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme 
but more efficiently than both the fixed subsidy scheme and independent lump sum subsidy 
scheme in reducing the possible conflicts. Apart from that, the fixed subsidy and 
independent lump sum subsidy schemes have been found to be equally efficient in reducing 
the conflict level. Actually, we found that Chorus is indifferent between the fixed subsidy 
and independent lump sum subsidy schemes when the condition    
  
  
 
  
   
 has been 
met,
100
 which means the options to suspend or accelerate the construction process are 
worthless.
101
 
Now, we are going to explain what causes the above subsidy schemes to have different 
performances in reducing the conflict level. A comparison from graph 7.2, graph 7.6 and 
graph 7.10 explains why the proportional subsidy scheme works better than both the fixed 
subsidy and independent lump sum subsidy in achieving the minimum level of conflict. That 
                                                          
100
 In order to test this argument, we set FS (the fixed subsidy payment) and LS (the lump sum subsidy 
payment) with condition    
  
  
 
  
   
 to make them comparable. Therefore, we can estimate not only the 
present value of conflict under the fixed subsidy but also the present value of conflict under the 
corresponding lump sum subsidy. (For any given lump sum subsidy, we can calculate the corresponding fixed 
subsidy directly through the condition    
  
  
 
  
   
 and then the corresponding conflict level.) The 
difference of conflict level under the above two subsidy schemes could be applied to test our argument. That 
is, the difference should equal zero when Chorus has identical behaviors under these two subsidy schemes 
and nonzero otherwise. We found the difference of conflict level always equals zero when we vary the LS. 
Besides, we extend our test by varying both LS and one of the interesting parameters (Con, volatility, DR, CR) 
to see whether our argument only holds for the baseline case. Similarly, we found the difference of conflict 
level equals zero all the time. 
101
 As we mention in chapter 5, a shift from the one period model to the two-period model allows the 
existence of extra flexibilities. That is, the decision maker in our model is allowed to suspend or accelerate the 
construction process. However, these extra flexibilities are valueless if Chorus reacts indifferently under fixed 
and independent lump sum subsidy schemes, which is our case. This is because, if Chorus never actually 
exercises these extra flexibilities, the fixed subsidy it receives must share the same present value as that of 
the independent lump sum subsidy. (Since we set FS and LS with condition    
  
  
 
  
   
, the present value 
of the fixed subsidy does not equal the present value of the independent lump sum subsidy when the private 
party is likely to exercise the extra flexibilities) Therefore Chorus will take the exact same actions in the 
construction under these two subsidy schemes. (As a result, the conflict levels are equal under these two 
subsidy schemes) 
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is, all subsidy schemes can maximize the PV HH at about the same amount
102
, however, the 
corresponding PV LL under the fixed and independent lump sum subsidies are lower than 
those under the proportional subsidy. In dollar terms, the proportional subsidy means we can 
have a relatively high subsidy for city HH and a relatively low subsidy for city LL. In 
contrast, Chorus receives the same values of subsidy for each city (either it is under the fixed 
subsidy scheme or the independent lump sum subsidy scheme), which implies it either 
under-subsidizes city HH or over-subsidizes city LL. Therefore the proportional subsidy 
scheme has the better match than the other two subsidy schemes in subsidizing the different 
cities. The reason that the demand relevant lump sum subsidy works even better than the 
proportional subsidy in reducing the conflict is due to its extra degree of freedom (The 
demand relevant lump sum subsidy enjoys two degree of freedom in subsidizing the cities, 
while the other three subsidy schemes only have one degree of freedom in subsidizing the 
cities). Since the conflict is mainly driven by city HH (a high demand city) and city LL (a 
low demand city),
103
 the demand relevant lump sum is able to fit both cities very well with 
different levels of subsidy, which solves the mismatching problem in the proportional, fixed 
and independent lump sum subsidy schemes. More specifically, in the other three subsidy 
schemes, although the conflicts of city HH and city LL could be reduced almost completely 
with the corresponding “optimal” levels of subsidy, the corresponding “optimal” level of 
subsidy for a high demand city is never a good match to the corresponding “optimal” level 
of subsidy for a low demand city.
104
 However, with the extra degree of freedom, there must 
be one combination of     and     that can reduce both the conflicts of city HH and city 
LL completely. Therefore, the demand relevant lump sum subsidy has the best performance 
among all subsidy schemes. 
Of course, there are different levels of information required to implement these four subsidy 
schemes. For example, for the proportional subsidy, CFH is required to learn Chorus‟ 
“actual” capital expenditure during each construction period in order to set the “optimal” 
monetary transfer. On the other hand, each city‟s demand state is required to be identified by 
CFH under the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme. Although both the fixed subsidy 
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 Since there is one degree of freedom for these three subsidy schemes, they should have the same 
performance in optimizing one value (Here is the PV HH). 
103
 For our baseline parameters, city HL is so profitable that both parties would like to build it up very quickly, 
while city LH is such a bad investment that neither party would like to construct it unless the demand turns 
out to be very good. Accordingly, CFH and Chorus will have almost no conflict in city HL and city LH. Therefore, 
the present value of conflict is mainly affected by two parties’ different behaviour in constructing city HH and 
city LL. 
104
 A comparison from graph7.2, graph 7.6 and graph 7.10 well supports this argument. 
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and independent lump subsidy schemes require no specific information (which is about 
demand or capital expenditure) to set up the monetary transfer, in each period, the fixed 
subsidy generally requires more information about the completion of UFB construction than 
the independent lump sum subsidy. More specifically, the independent lump subsidy scheme 
requires learning how many final construction stages in total have been completed in each 
period, while the fixed subsidy scheme not only needs to learn about the final construction 
stages but also how many of the first construction stages have been finished in each period. 
However, when relating the information requirement to the efficiency in reducing the 
conflict level, we found the specific information helps reduce the conflict level while the 
extra information about the completion of UFB construction does not.
105
 Certainly, the extra 
information requirements may not be a “free lunch” to CFH due to the extra monitoring 
costs.
106
 Therefore, any shift among these subsidy schemes is justified if the margin of 
conflict it reduces dominates the margin of extra monitoring cost. In other words, when 
shifting subsidy schemes the maximum cost for extra monitoring should be less than the 
present value of the reduced conflict. Therefore, for our baseline parameters, the extra 
monitoring cost cannot exceed 0.88 if CFH is to benefit for shifting from the independent 
lump sum subsidy scheme to the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme, while the 
maximum extra monitoring cost cannot exceed 0.21 if CFH is to benefit for shifting from the 
independent lump sum subsidy scheme to the proportional subsidy scheme. Further on, when 
CFH needs to choose from the demand relevant lump sum subsidy and proportional subsidy 
schemes, we believe the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme dominates the 
proportional subsidy scheme. This is because, compared to the proportional subsidy scheme, 
the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme not only has better performance in reducing 
the conflict level but also suffers less from the extra monitoring costs.
107
 In the extreme case 
that a change of subsidy scheme does not reduce any conflict, any extra monitoring cost will 
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 Certainly, the heterogeneity of each city in demand and cost state is the main source of conflict. Therefore, 
any information which can help CFH better identifying these states should improve the power of incentive 
scheme. 
106
 A shift from the independent lump subsidy scheme to the fixed subsidy scheme raises an extra cost to CFH 
in verifying how many of first stage constructions in total are under construction (counting the numbers of 
first stage construction). However, a shift from the fixed subsidy scheme to the proportional subsidy scheme 
causes an extra cost to CFH in verifying the “actual” construction expenditure for each undertaking 
construction stage. Further on, a shift from the independent lump subsidy scheme to the demand relevant 
lump sum subsidy scheme causes an extra cost to CFH in verifying whether the cities finished in the last 
period are high demand or low demand. 
107
 Generally speaking, it is easier for the third party to collect the demand information than the information 
about capital expenditure. For example, in a bridge construction, the public party can figure out the traffic 
flow easily by setting up a group of security cameras. However, it is more difficult for them to identify 
whether the contractor inflated the construction expenditure.  
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be too much. Therefore a shift from the independent lump sum subsidy scheme to the fixed 
subsidy scheme should never be preferred.  
7.4 The study of fine schemes 
Similarly to the subsidy schemes, CFH could discipline Chorus in the UFB project through a 
fine scheme. That is, Chorus could be required to pay a penalty whenever it fails a target 
designated by CFH. We start our study of fine schemes by considering a simple fine scheme. 
7.4.1 The simple fine scheme 
Under the simple fine scheme, CFH could penalize Chorus when Chorus fails the target at 
date 24 (which is the terminal date). The amount of fine Chorus needs to pay depends on the 
number of cities not yet finished. For example, if CFH wants Chorus to finish all four cities, 
then Chorus will be required to pay CFH an amount           for each city not completed 
on or before date 24. Apart from the timing of the monetary transfer, the simple fine scheme 
may look like the independent lump sum subsidy scheme with the negative subsidy payment. 
We report how the conflict level varies with the simple fine scheme at graph 7.19. 
Graph 7.19: The present value of conflict varies with the simple fine (target date at 
date 24) 
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 As we may find from graph 7.19, the conflict level under the simple fine scheme shares the 
same non-monotonic relationship to the level of fine as the subsidy schemes. However, the 
conflict level under the simple fine scheme is minimized at 0.891 when the level of the fine 
equals 20. The logic behind the non-monotonic change of the conflict level is 
straightforward. When the level of fine goes up, Chorus acts more and more aggressively in 
the UFB network‟s construction in order to avoid the penalty. Recall that the increase of 
Chorus‟s aggression in construction first results in a better match between the two parties‟ 
construction preferences.
108
 Therefore, the conflict level decreases in the first half of graph 
7.19. However, after the level of fine reaches a certain level, the further increase of the fine 
forces Chorus to act more aggressively in the UFB network‟s construction than CFH would 
like.
109
 Consequentially, the increased deviation between the construction preferences of the 
two parties fuels up the level of conflict in the second half of graph 7.19. 
Graph 7.20: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’ optimal 
policy) vary with the simple fine (target date at date 24) 
 
For the simple fine scheme, we rationalize the minimum level of conflict by considering the 
present values to CFH of individual cities (under Chorus‟ optimal policy). Unsurprisingly, 
we observe that PV LL and PV LH under the simple fine scheme (at graph 7.20) follow the 
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 Refer to our discussion about the optimal proportional subsidy at section 7.3.1. 
109
 This is the case, especially for constructing city LH. 
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same movements as those under the subsidy schemes
110
, and that they are dominated by the 
PV HH as long as the level of fine is not extreme. Therefore, the minimum conflict level 
should be determined by PV HH, which has a peak when the level of the fine equals 20. As a 
result, the conflict level reaches its minimum when the level of fine equals 20.  
We plot the timing conflict and sequencing conflict measures at graph 7.21 and graph 7.22 
respectively. As we can see, both timing and sequencing conflict measures are quite similar 
to those under the independent lump sum subsidy scheme.
111
 Of course, the corresponding 
turning point of the sequencing conflict measure and the intersections of the timing conflict 
measure are slightly different from those under the independent lump sum subsidy.  
Graph 7.21: The timing conflict measures vary with the simple fine (target date at date 
24) 
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 This conclusion is drawn from a comparison of graph 7.2, graph 7.6, graph 7.10 and graph 7.14. 
111
 This conclusion is drawn from a comparison of graph 7.11, graph 7.12, graph 7.21 and graph 7.22. 
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Graph 7.22: The sequencing conflict measures vary with the simple fine (target date at 
date 24) 
 
Graph 7.23: The present value of the UFB project for Chorus varies with the simple 
fine (target date at date 24) 
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Although the simple fine scheme can largely eliminate the potential conflicts, in practice, 
there exists a participation constraint to Chorus when the fine scheme is undertaken. That is, 
Chorus does not want to be part of UFB network‟s construction after the fine reaches a 
certain level. Therefore, in order to investigate the participation constraint, we plot the 
present value of the UFB project for Chorus as a function of the fine level for the simple fine 
scheme at graph 7.23. As we can see, the present value of the UFB project for Chorus 
( ,           -) decreases with the level of fine and becomes negative when the level of fine 
goes over 8, which implies that the feasible level of the simple fine cannot go beyond 8. 
From Graph 7.19, the minimum level of conflict that guarantees the participation of Chorus 
equals 6,
112
 which implies the simple fine scheme is much less efficient than the subsidy 
schemes in reducing the conflict level. 
7.4.2 The two dimensional fine scheme 
In this section, we are going to extend our analysis of fines from a simple fine scheme to a 
two dimensional fine scheme. In practice, we construct the two dimensional fine scheme by 
adding a target at date 12 to the simple fine scheme. More specifically, this new target 
requires Chorus to finish at least two cities at date 12. Otherwise, at date 12, Chorus needs to 
pay the amounts             for only finishing one city and               for finishing 
no city. Similar to the simple fine scheme, Chorus is required to pay             at date 24 
for each unfinished city. Accordingly, we have a 3D plot for how the conflict level varies 
with the two dimensional fine scheme at graph 7.24. 
At graph 7.24, we find that the conflict level is dominated by the fine at date 24 (we label it 
as            ). That is, the increase of fine at date 24 dramatically decreases the conflict 
level, while the increase of fine at date 12 hardly changes the conflict level.
113
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 In practice, Chorus may not join the UFB project unless the present value of UFB project is beyond a 
certain positive value. Therefore, the minimum level of conflict that guarantees the participation of Chorus 
will shift up.  
113
 The increase of fine at date 12 only slightly raises the level of conflict when the fine at date 24 is lower 
than 5. 
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Graph 7.24: The conflict level varies with the two dimensions fine  
 
Graph 7.25 shows how the present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus‟ 
optimal policy) vary with the two dimensional fine. Although city HL has the highest present 
value, it is hardly affected by any fines. (The present value to CFH of city HL is a smooth 
plane at graph 7.25.) However, the present value of city HH decreases with the fine at date 
24. In contrast, the present value of city LL is barely affected by either fine most of the time. 
Nevertheless, the PV LL has a higher value when both fines are quite small.
114
 Recall that 
the difference between two parties in constructing city HH is the main driver of conflict. 
Therefore, the fine that determines the present value of city HH, which is the fine at date 24, 
should be the main determinant of the conflict level. Besides, we believe the conflict under 
the two-dimensional fine scheme is solely attributed to the timing conflict rather than the 
sequencing conflict.
115
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 The PV LL has a higher value when both fines at date 24 and date 12 are below 5, which explains why the 
conflict level (at graph 7.24) sinks at this area. 
115
 Since the conditional probability that Chorus wants to complete city HH second providing that at least two 
cities will be finished always equals 0, the sequencing conflict measure under the two dimensional fine 
scheme is not affected by any fines.  
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Graph 7.25: The present values to CFH of the individual cities (under Chorus’ optimal 
policy) vary with the two dimensional fine  
  
  
 
As for the simple fine scheme, we need to include the participation constraint to determine 
the feasible minimum conflict level for the two dimensional fine scheme. We plot the 
present value of the UFB project for Chorus as a function of the two fines at graph 7.26. This 
result is the same as that of the simple fine scheme. That is, the present value of the UFB 
project for Chorus ( ,           -) decreases with the fine at date 24 and becomes negative 
when             goes over 8. Correspondingly, the minimum level of conflict (under the 
two dimensional fine scheme) that fits Chorus‟s participation constraint is equal to 6,116 
which suggests the two dimensional fine scheme does not perform much more efficiently 
than the simple fine scheme in reducing the conflict level.  
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 Similarly, the minimum conflict may shift up when the participation constraint not longer equals 0. 
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Graph 7.26: The present value of the UFB project for Chorus varies with the two 
dimensional fine (target date at date 24) 
 
7.4.3 Comments on the fine schemes 
In summary, if Chorus could be forced to take part (so that the participation constraint was 
not present) the fine schemes seem to work quite well in managing the conflict.
117
 However, 
the involvement of the participation constraint restricts the level of fine CFH may choose, 
which results in the fine schemes being much less efficient than the subsidy schemes in 
reducing the conflict level. Besides, we find that a shift from the simple fine scheme to the 
two dimensional fine scheme makes no improvement in conflict reduction. 
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 Even the simple fine scheme has a better performance than the fixed and independent lump sum subsidy 
in reducing the conflict level. 
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Chapter 8: Concluding remarks  
This thesis develops a model that investigates aspects of New Zealand‟s largest PPP project. 
The model features four cities with different demand and construction-cost characteristics. It 
is used to study the different choices of Chorus and CFH. Using a real options approach, we 
identify two sorts of potential conflicts between the two parties: a timing conflict about the 
number of cities the two parties would like to develop in each period and a sequencing 
conflict about the order in which the UFB network is rolled out in different cities. Inspired 
by the incomplete contracting and information asymmetry literatures, we introduce several 
incentive schemes (including four subsidy schemes and two fine schemes) that help manage 
the possible conflicts. By comparing their ability to reduce the potential conflicts and 
sensitivity analysis, we end up with four main findings in this study.  
First, the magnitude of the conflict is a non-monotonic function of the inter-city demand 
differences (DR) and the inter-city construction-cost differences (CR); it is an increasing 
function of the ratio of consumer surplus to the square of producer surplus (Con) and of 
demand volatility. Since Con and demand volatility are not within the public party‟s control 
anyway, CFH may minimize the conflicts through “choosing” either DR or CR. These 
parameters are treated as exogenous in our analysis. However, in practice, CFH could 
influence the values of DR and CR by the way it divides the country. That is, in order to 
make both parties agree on the construction order and construction timing, either CFH would 
like to make the cities as heterogeneous as possible (in this way, CFH wants to make either 
DR or CR as big as possible when the other parameters are fixed); or it would like to make 
the cities as homogeneous as possible (in this way, CFH wants to make either DR or CR 
close to 1 when the other parameters are fixed). However, the first method may not be a 
good solution for CFH. This is because when CFH arranges cities in groups that are as 
heterogeneous as possible, it not only reduces the conflicts between the two parties but also 
increases the likelihood that Chorus may abandon part of project (this is not CFH‟s 
intention). For example, if CFH groups all the high demand cities to one city like Auckland 
and all the low demand cities to one city like Hamilton,
118
 Chorus may abandon Hamilton 
quite easily if the demand turns out to be low. Nevertheless, if Chorus breaks up the whole 
country more equally to one city like Wellington and the other city like Christchurch,
119
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 Auckland is the city with largest population density, while Hamilton is the city with smallest population 
density. This implies the UFB roll-out in Auckland may be much more profitable than that in Hamilton. 
119
 Wellington and Christchurch shares the similar population density. 
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Chorus may abandon neither city unless the demand is extremely low. Beside, by dividing 
the whole country into a very big city and a very small city (this is one of the simplest way 
to make the cities as heterogeneous as possible), CFH hands over almost all decision 
flexibility to Chorus, which may not be optimal for CFH.
120
 Therefore, in practice, CFH 
should break up the country into homogeneous regions as much as possible when it designs 
the UFB deployment plan. 
Second, the demand relevant lump sum subsidy has the best performance among all included 
incentive schemes in controlling the possible conflicts. More specifically, the demand 
relevant lump sum subsidy scheme works better than the proportional subsidy scheme 
121
 (a 
cost dependent subsidy scheme) in reducing the potential conflicts but comes with the lower 
monitoring costs. The above finding suggests CFH should design the incentive scheme using 
information based on demand rather than information based on construction expenditures. 
This is consistent with what CFH is doing in the real world. Recall that CFH has claimed to 
subsidize Chorus a fixed amount of money for each household Chorus is going to pass on 
the UFB roll-out, which implies that the subsidy is insensitive to the construction 
expenditures per-household. On the other hand, Chorus is required to pay back the subsidy at 
an earlier date if the fibre uptake rate is below 20% in 2019. In other words, the subsidy 
Chorus receives has a higher present value when the demand turns out to high, which 
indicates the incentive scheme is sensitive to the demand. 
Third, the conflict level becomes quite sensitive to the subsidy scheme in two cases. A) 
When either DR or CR turns out to be modest; B) When either Con or  turns out to be 
large. The above result may provide some suggestions in managing the optimal subsidy. 
That is, CFH should avoid setting the subsidy rate either too high or too low when either DR 
or CR turns out to be modest. Otherwise, the “wrong” subsidy rate set by CFH may result in 
a large social welfare loss due to the high conflict level. However, when DR is extreme 
(either too big or too small), CFH only needs to avoid setting the subsidy rate too high 
otherwise Chorus is encouraged to build up city LH. In contrast, when either Con or  
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 In the incomplete contract view, dividing the whole UFB project into a very big city and a very small city is 
the same as treating the whole UFB project as a sole city (since the small city does not matter), which makes 
the contract as incomplete as possible. This may eliminate the conflict completely, but at the same time, it 
limits CFH’s ability to specify its construction preference through a formal contract. For example, CFH is no 
longer able to specify the construction order between cities (such as which city goes first and which city goes 
next) and constructing timing (that is the numbers of city that CFH want Chorus to finish). Therefore, Chorus 
may be able to roll out the UFB project in a way it likes, which may not be optimal to CFH. 
121
 The proportional subsidy scheme has the second best performance in reducing the conflict. 
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becomes relatively large, CFH should provide a high level subsidy to Chorus. Actually, a 
high level subsidy works regardless of Con. In reality, these model parameters (DR, CR, 
Con and  ) may not be constant for CFH over time.122 CFH‟s estimation of these model 
parameters may sometimes serve as the warning signs in managing the subsidy scheme. For 
example, when either DR or CR is close to certain modest numbers, a relatively small 
change of either parameter may lead the conflict level from the area where the conflict level 
is insensitive to the subsidy rate to the area where the conflict level is very sensitive to the 
subsidy rate. This indicates that CFH may need to manage the subsidy rate very carefully in 
case a small change of DR or CR dramatically raises the conflict level. In contrast, when 
either DR or CR is an extreme number, CFH may not need to worry about the subsidy rate 
since the conflict level is quite low regardless of the subsidy rate, and more important, it 
takes a relatively big change of DR or CR (which means more unlikely to happen) to lead 
the conflict level from the area where the conflict level is insensitive to the subsidy rate to 
the area where the conflict level is very sensitive to the subsidy rate. Further on, CFH may 
need to be very careful in the parameter estimation. This is because if CFH get a wrong 
value for the parameter, it may provide Chorus a wrong level of subsidy. Therefore, the 
corresponding conflict between these two parties will be massive. 
Last, although the fine schemes come with the low monitoring cost, they are generally 
outperformed by the subsidy schemes due to their participation constraints. Therefore, in the 
case where only one incentive scheme could be used, CFH should always go for a subsidy 
scheme rather than a fine scheme. This is consistent with the fact that CFH adopted a 
subsidy scheme as the main incentive scheme in UFB roll-out. A fine up to $350 million 
only is introduced to discourage Chorus from abandoning the UFB project. However, if CFH 
would like to combine a fine scheme with a subsidy scheme (which helps relaxing the 
participation constraint), the ideal candidate for the add-on subsidy scheme will be the 
independent lump sum subsidy scheme.
123
 We may need to realise that it is very difficult to 
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 Even when these model parameters are constant over time, CFH may not know their true values when CFH 
designs the incentive scheme and signs up the UFB contract with Chorus. In this case, CFH can only have 
estimation on these model parameters based on the information it has collected.  As we know, the estimated 
parameters may not necessarily be consistent with their true values. Therefore, in CFH’s understanding, these 
parameters may not be constant. Besides, these parameters do experience some shocks under certain 
circumstances. One good example may be the 2011 Christchurch’s earthquake. The population of 
Christchurch has dropped 2.4 per cent after the city experienced a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, which may 
potentially increase the Cost Ratio but reduces the demand ratio due to the reduction of population density.  
123
 In the cost-benefit view, the fixed subsidy scheme is strictly dominated by the independent lump sum 
subsidy scheme, while the proportional subsidy scheme is strictly dominated by the demand relevant lump 
sum subsidy scheme. Therefore, the fixed subsidy and proportional subsidy scheme should be excluded 
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find out the optimal combination between a fine scheme and a subsidy scheme. This is 
because the fine scheme has so many choice variables.  
In this thesis, we have provided several suggestions to CFH that may help manage the 
conflict when the UFB rollout is conducted in a form of private public partnership. Through 
the lens of incomplete contracting, the more CFH can specify what it wants in designing the 
UFB deployment plan and incentive scheme, the less freedom CFH may pass to Chorus. 
Therefore the less conflict may rise on the UFB rollout. However, the completeness of 
contracting does not come for free and more extra monitoring costs may be involved when 
CFH are making the UFB contract more complete. Therefore, there is always a tradeoff 
between the contract completeness and monitoring cost when CFH is contracting with 
Chorus. Overall, this thesis provides a better understanding about the above tradeoff under a 
PPP project, and more important, several practical suggestions have been derived to improve 
the optimal contracting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
anyway. However, the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme is never an ideal add-on to the fine 
schemes. This is because, if CFH is looking for the minimum conflict, it should always employ the demand 
relevant lump sum subsidy alone since the demand relevant lump sum subsidy scheme can eliminate the 
conflict almost. On the other hand, if CFH is looking for the minimum monitoring cost, the independent lump 
sum subsidy should be preferred since it comes with the lowest monitoring cost. 
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